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National ideology is a topic worth discussing, 
at least currently. Hence, the state recently 
became concerned with this issue: an ad hoc 
commission was set up, tasked with drafting a 
project for Kyrgyzstan’s national ideology and 
submitting it to the President and parliament by 
February 20. Such a situation should be well 
known to middle aged and elderly people, par-
alleling our recent history: a strive to send down 
from above some sort of a “Code of a construc-
tor….” Probably, this code will be something 
of a combination (though not a synthesis) of 
traditionalism, liberalism, communism and, 
perhaps, nationalism. I suppose that the main 
thesis of this intellectual product will resemble 
the following: “The Kyrgyz national state will 
strengthen democracy and market economy, 
although strictly controlling these spheres by 
taking into account the traditions and history of 
the Kyrgyz people.” 
Perhaps, national ideology (if it is indeed need-
ed) comprises certain cultural, political and 
economic reference points, which are formed 
on the basis of a national value system. How-
ever, to be guided in this context by something 
from the distant past means building an eth-
nographic museum – a quasi-state, which will 
be visited by a few foreign tourists – lovers of 
exotic. 
To start with, it is obvious that we should ac-
knowledge at the level of national conscious-
ness and perception the achievements of oth-
ers. Rather than imitate and copy, we should 
learn what is considered to be advanced and 
progressive in the contemporary world, as Ja-
pan and other Asian states have done for ex-
ample. Acknowledging other’s achievements 
does not mean mechanically applying them 
in one’s life and trying to become “civilized 
clones;” rather it means carefully and critically 
absorbing the best features. It is only the intel-
lectual elite that can learn from other’s experi-
ence and achievements. The intellectual elite is 
not merely the totality of highly educated peo-
ple; it is a highly qualifi ed group of people with 
ideas, which will take the country out of crisis 
and lead it forward. However, it is important to 
remember that formation of elites is a matter of 
time. It is also known that national culture and 
religion are not hindering this process, unless 
the latter are dressed up ideologically, includ-
ing forms such as chauvinism, nationalism, 
fascism, etc.
Therefore, I will express a contradictory and 
paradoxical view (which is debatable more-
over): National ideology should be de-ideolo-
gized. 
It is known that to build a competitive state, 
three mandatory elements are required: 
1) a socio-economic basis,  2) totality of cul-
tural values, and  3) behavioral parameters of 
the leaders of the nation. 
A socio-economic basis, as I view it, means the 
formation of a socio-economic space which is 
harmoniously built into international economic 
relations. A socio-economic space is a national 
economic culture which denies earning through 
begging. 
Cultural values are not necessarily only mate-
rial and spiritual achievements. They are, fi rst 
of all, a culture of interactions between people 
of different categorical sectors. They are also a 
culture of abiding laws, which unfortunately is 
lacking in Kyrgyzstan. Unless the question of 
“What is stronger in Kyrgyzstan – a law or 
family connections, a law or a phone call?” 
does not disappear from our lives (in favor of 
law), there is no point in talking about abiding 
laws. 
Behavioral parameters of leaders mean a be-
havioral culture of the elite, which is still non-
existent in our country. Why leaders or elite in 
particular? Because it is the leaders who lead 
*    Muratbek Imanaliev is President of the Institute for Public Policy, Associate Professor of the American University-Central Asia.
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the people, and not vice versa. I am not talk-
ing about future generations and other things, 
which is related to the nonmaterial sphere of 
our people’s lives. 
In order to achieve the abovementioned goals, 
we should start with building or creating the fol-
lowing foundations: 
• Self-identifi cation of the citizens of the 
country;
• Formation of elites; 
• Creation of a national value system.    
Self-identifi cation is a very complicated pro-
cess. Ethnic, civic, economic, or cultural self-
identifi cation – what comes fi rst? I believe we 
should promote all.
Political, economic, intellectual, military, or aca-
demic elites – which is more important? I think 
all are important.
Formation of a national value system, as it ap-
pears to me, should start from the only correct 
idea, related to identity and elites. That idea is 
the following: nation as co-citizenship, and re-
sponsibility for each and all.
And the last question – why seven? The an-
swer is simple – seven is a lucky number for 
Kyrgyzstan. 
The following “Project for the future Kyrgyz-
stan” is a call for discussion and refl ection. 
Project for the future Kyrgyzstan
1. Seven priorities:
• priority of Kyrgyz statehood;
• priority of forming and consolidating an “in-
ternal national power base;”
• priority of democratic government;
• priority of independent attitudes;
•priority of complete integration into the inter-
national community;
• priority of security and progress;
• priority of mountains and water.
2. Seven cults:
• cult of the future of the nation and belief in 
God;
• cult of ancestors;
• cult of family;
• cult of freedom;
• cult of law;
• cult of education;
• cult of health.
3. Seven freedoms:
• freedom of the individual;
• freedom of speech;
• freedom of conscience;
• freedom of choice;
• freedom of movement;
• freedom of owning property and handing it 
down to children;
• freedom of fully enjoying one’s achieve-
ments.
4. Seven qualities:
• quality of individual persons;
• quality of government;
• quality of labor and its results;
• quality of housing;
• quality of nourishment;
• quality of water;
• quality of land.
5. Seven senses:
• sense of patriotism;
• sense of duty;
• sense of solidarity;
• sense of dignity;
• sense of novelty and progress;
• sense of justice;
• sense of comfort and its achievement.
6. Seven conditions:
• condition of unity;
• condition of forming and realizing the Na-
tional idea;
• condition of possessing a national economic 
culture;
• condition of the absence of hostile environ-
ment;
• condition of developing political, intellectual 
and economic elites;
• condition of balanced relations within a 
triangle of “individual-society-state” and of 
forming a new behavioral culture;
• condition of support on the part of the world 
community.
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7. Seven evils:
• evil of provincialism and marginal thinking;
• evil of universal vulnerability;
• evil of alcoholism, drug addiction and crimi-
nality;
• evil of laziness and dependence;
• evil of excessive illusions and mythmaking;
• evil of failing to acknowledge other’s 
achievements;
• evil of traditionalism.
50. We are no better and no worse than oth-
ers.
Ishenbai Abdurazakov: There is a lot of talk 
about ideology at present; however, it is unclear 
what type of ideology people are talking about, 
as the notion of ideology has many meanings. 
One can talk about ideology merely as a system 
of various ideas – political, economic, legal, 
etc. One can talk about moral norms, which is 
also a part of the world-outlook approach to the 
realities of life. Some 
say that religion 
is not ideology, 
but as a matter 
of fact, it is also 
ideology. Ideology 
is manifold. It could 
be class-based, 
which is Marxist ideology with utterly different 
principles, different approaches, and which 
has pretensions to offering global solutions to 
issues faced by humankind. You also know 
how it ended. Nevertheless, there are a lot 
questions, and it is premature to have a fi nal 
say over their resolution, because Marxism, 
as it appears to me, is a secularized ideal of 
justice, transformed from Christianity to political 
reality.
Today, we live in a pragmatic world, realistically 
speaking. What should we talk about then? We 
should either talk about some ethno-cultural 
ideological approach (specifi cally about a Kyrgyz 
ideological approach) or about the ideology of a 
country, a state, in which not only ethnic Kyrgyz 
reside. If we talk about state ideology, then we 
should have other parameters and approaches, 
i.e. it is necessary to approve those ideological 
norms which would be shared by all citizens of 
our country; otherwise, it will not work. Those 
who carry a banner of ideology claim that it is 
impossible to live without ideology. They claim 
that all shortcomings, all evils are due to the 
obscurity of the existing ideology. People, 
especially those of the older generation, claim 
that under the Soviet system there was a 
certain organization of work, that we used to 
reach certain goals or over fulfi ll plans, that the 
crime rate was not as high as today, that there 
was no prostitution, that relations between 
people were not as rough as today. There was 
a certain system, which is non-existent today, 
but it is impossible to mechanically apply that 
system in today’s reality. Others claim that we, 
Kyrgyz, once upon a time lived in ideal society 
with no theft or crime, that everyone deferring to 
seniors, that there were many things resembling 
Confucianism… As evidence of this ideal life, 
they cite proverbs, sayings that have survived. 
But the folklore refl ects negative, sarcastic, and 
NATIONAL IDEOLOGY: CHOOSING THE DIRECTION
A roundtable on the topic of national ideology was held at the Institute for Public Policy on 22 Feb-
ruary 2006. Ishenbai Abdurazakov, former State Secretary of the Kyrgyz Republic; Valentin Bo-
gatyrev, Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, adviser of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, and Muratbek Imanaliev, President of the 
Institute for Public Policy were invited as the main speakers. Independent experts, representatives 
of research centers, political parties and public organizations also took part in the discussion. The 
discussion touched the issues of national self-identifi cation, national goals and practical implemen-
tation of ideology. Below is the transcript of the roundtable.
There is a lot of 
talk about ideology 
today; however, it is 
unclear what type of 
ideology people are 
talking about.
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ironic assessments as well. This is on the one 
hand. On the other hand, many cultural values 
refl ected a certain level of development. If 
people lived in mountains and they did not have 
certain material values; each had as much as 
the other did. Therefore, was there any point in 
stealing anything? But at the same time, theft 
thrived in a different form – abaction. 
On the one hand, to apply values of distant 
history is utopian; on the other hand it is unclear 
how can we restore the past back under 
conditions of market economy. Therefore, it 
appears to me that we should not talk about 
some moral ideology; instead, we should talk 
more about a national goal. Do our people 
have a certain dream – what kind of people do 
we want to become? Do we want to become 
people according to our epic notions, which as 
a matter of principle is impossible? Or, do we 
want to adjust to the present day and utilize the 
yet unspent, living intellectual potential of our 
people? If we pose questions this way, then 
we should reason differently. Then issues of 
creative activity and moral health of the society 
come into the foreground. What is creative? 
Each person, citizen, Kyrgyz should be able 
to create something; and to do this he or she 
needs knowledge. There is need for science 
and technology – things that will enable our 
people to move forward, to raise the level of 
culture, and to coexist on equal terms with more 
developed countries. We do have such abilities. 
We often criticize ourselves, Kyrgyz, for being 
lazy, and we should admit that it is indeed so. 
When I compare in general our society, our 
public with other countries, specifi cally Far 
Eastern, it seems that we are so lazy; that is 
the limit. We do not like laboring much, but 
realizing the necessity of labor is a completely 
different notion, is it not? This is where some 
issues related to our present values originate. 
Many say that Western ideology and Western 
values contradict our national foundations. I 
absolutely disagree with this. We have pure 
Kyrgyz, Islamic and Turkic values. In many 
instances they came into contact or related 
with other similar values, and no culture, no 
civilization can claim a monopoly in producing 
and maintaining moral or other values. If we 
refer to Islamic values, we can locate the same 
values in Christianity. Scholars know very 
well that the Koran, and Islam in general, is a 
continuation, a branch of Christianity. For a long 
time Islam was viewed as a Christian sect. Those 
who have read Dante’s Divine Comedy know 
that Muhammad was sent to hell for becoming 
a sectarian, having abandoned Christianity… 
Our moral and other legacies are no different in 
terms of quality from many others. Especially if 
we compare it with Chinese-Confucian values, 
then we will see many things in common. It is a 
different matter that the ideas of Confucianism 
were gradually being implemented in life during 
the course of many years, and have become 
a norm of life for many. We keep talking about 
them over and over, but observe them very 
seldom – nobody can deny this. 
We need an ideology which will serve our 
national goal. At the present stage, there is only 
one goal – to achieve progress for our country; 
to move forward and not lag behind others; not 
to turn into a world village, an ethnographic 
museum. We are as smart as others are; 
therefore, we should utilize our potential. Now 
many say that globalization is a misfortune, 
God’s punishment. Yet, it is reality and we 
cannot escape it. Civilization is bypassing us, 
but the sooner we adapt, the better for us. We 
should prepare for this eventuality.
Muratbek Imanaliev: The main problem of our 
people is that we do not have anything to push off 
from. The history of our people is nothing more 
than a myth, a mythologized understanding of 
what happened. Like Chukchas, for example, 
have a conception that they have traveled to the 
Moon. It is the same situation here, but more 
overgrown with legends. Mythologized calques 
of one of the histories of another people. 
Ishenbai Abdurazakov 
1991-1994 – Consul General of the USSR/
Russia in Sapporo, Japan; 
1994-1996 – Adviser to the President of the 
Kyrgyz Republic; 
1996-1999 – State Secretary of the Kyrgyz 
Republic. 
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Dip-
lomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Member of the Board of Trustees of 
the American University – Central Asia.
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The problem is that there is no documented 
history, even nowadays. History is not only 
about events; history is philosophy, mode of 
life, economics, fundamental things which the 
people had. People often talk about certain 
traditions which were very good. I often argue 
with our so-called traditionalists that traditions as 
constructions of social, political, and economic 
life, as I see them, have not survived. They 
survived as certain thesis information in the 
historical memory of the people. For instance, 
they tried to revive a court of the elderly – to 
“exhume” it, to pull it out from the grave. But it 
failed, as in reality the memory of the people 
has preserved only a thesis that this court of 
the elderly once existed. They cannot fi gure out 
how the court functioned. Therefore, in forming 
a national ideology we do not have anything to 
push off from. As a result, there is a problem 
of the identity of the nation. Since there is no 
documented history, we scarcely see ourselves 
within some geography, within a frame of 
reference, such as those that are known to 
European people and certain groups of Asian 
people. For example, if we take a broad, large-
scale, galactic identity, then it is not even clear 
whether Kyrgyz are Asians or non-Asians. This 
big question deals with a more specifi c system 
of coordination, related to regional identity and 
identity in a nomadic world. Since there is no 
basic identity element of our history, it is very 
diffi cult to move forward.
Living in the year 2006, we try to imitate 
Americans or Europeans like novices; we want 
to live like them. But the problem is that all 
four world revolutions occurred far away from 
the vast region that we are living in. I mean 
the English, French, American and October 
revolutions, no matter how paradoxical it may 
sound coming from me. As a matter of fact, 
in 1917 the local population, including its 
intellectual elite, absolutely did not understand 
what had happened. For many people, a red 
tsar replaced a white tsar, which did not provide 
a push off for identity either. 
A culture of thinking is a very important 
component, and it requires years and certain 
efforts on the part of the nation in general. 
From my point of view, several layers represent 
a world outlook structure. What we currently 
feel is a layer of shamanism: some pre-historic 
conception of oneself and the surrounding 
world. There is barbarian communism, which 
was absolutely inapplicable in Central Asia. 
There is Islam, though it is only ceremonial 
Islam, particularly in northern Kyrgyzstan. 
Theology as the study of religion is non-existent 
here. Nobody here dealt with it properly – only 
strangers. In general, the population does not 
accept or understand Islam.  Finally, what we 
acquired is some mosaic of very fragmented 
elements – liberalism for example, which we 
also understand utterly ridiculously: “well, 
since there is democracy and liberalism, it 
means that you can do whatever you want.” It 
is striking that these four layers did not result in 
synthesis; they function separately. Therefore, 
depending on the situation, a certain layer 
operates in each person. For example, when 
a person sits in the “White House” and holds 
negotiations with someone from the West, he 
is a liberal and a democrat to the core because 
the layer related to that specifi c situation and 
perception starts operating in him. At home, the 
same person behaves as a feudal lord – talks 
about Islamic ceremonial things, that a wife 
should obey her husband, etc. When it comes 
to health, he remembers some shamanistic 
things.
All these things are important for an 
understanding of where we could proceed at 
all. Therefore, from this point of view, I think 
that it is very diffi cult to talk about a certain 
national ideology, to try to do something so that 
everyone would understand it. The search for all 
of this is taking place during very diffi cult times 
of general degradation of the country. When I 
talk about degradation and dehumanization of 
Muratbek Imanaliev 
President of the Institute for Public Policy  
In 1991-1992 and 1997-2002 served as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan;
1993-96 – Ambassador of Kyrgyzstan to the 
People’s Republic of China. 
Imanaliev is chairman of the political council 
of the Justice and Progress Party; co-founder 
of Jany Bagyt Movement and Associate 
Professor at the American University – 
Central Asia.
-7-
National ideology: choosing the direction
K
Y
R
G
Y
ZS
TA
N
 B
R
IE
F 
  I
ss
ue
 №
 3
social relations, it does not mean that we are 
entering some darkness. Degradation and 
dehumanization, as you may know from the 
laws of dialectics, possess hidden positive 
element which could push us forward. It could 
indeed happen, if we do not cross the line, of 
course, as in Africa. Therefore, in this case I 
also think that we should talk about a certain 
national idea, a national dream. 
The material aspect of life, unfortunately, has 
absorbed the nonmaterial, spiritual sphere of the 
life of humankind for several recent centuries. 
The so-called American dream, American dollar, 
and American fl ag have struck an especially 
diffi cult and unbalanced blow. People want to 
live rich lives by any means – some by stealing, 
others want to honestly earn, etc. In contrast, 
the national goal should be free from being 
an ideologized or overly materialized idea, 
because authentic values address spiritual life, 
not material. For instance, relations between 
the elderly and children – respect to seniors. 
Unfortunately, I do not see any respect on the 
part of the youth towards the seniors, or of men 
towards women.
I am convinced that the nonmaterial sphere of 
life plays a bigger role compared to material, i.e. 
the economy, etc. I will mention the following 
example: In 1963, Korea and Zambia had the 
same starting positions in economic terms. In 
ten years, the Korean economy exceeded the 
Zambian economy four times, notwithstanding 
the fact that Zambia still exports strategic 
raw materials, whereas Korea did not enjoy 
such opportunities. It means that something 
other than materialism is the basis for the 
development of the economy. It could be the 
same Confucianism – certain national Korean 
values…. Remember the year 1998, when 
Koreans stood in lines and handed over their 
valuables in order to save their country. Could 
the same thing happen here? I doubt it – not 
because the population is poor, but because 
there is an entirely different system. I think it 
would be preferable to achieve all of this by 
relying on the very important postulate that 
the nation is a fellow-citizenship of people 
residing in this country. This is a very serious 
problem for me. Is the titular ethnicity – Kyrgyz, 
its elite, intellectual part, if it still has internal 
mechanisms for self-development – able to 
advance the idea that all ethnicities living here 
are fellow-citizens? Currently, 20 percent of 
the population of Kyrgyzstan (irrespective of 
their ethnicity) are not citizens of this country. 
People have Russian or Kazakh citizenships, 
and in the south Uzbek citizenship. That is, 
they do not see themselves as citizens of this 
country, and try to acquire the citizenship of 
their historic homeland.
Besides a culture of thinking, which could be 
developed only on the basis of very serious 
education, I think that it is very important to 
have a national-economic culture, that this is a 
very important aspect. If you deal with political 
science, then you should know that a socio-
economic basis, cultural values, and conduct of 
leaders determine a country’s development in 
one direction or another. Therefore, economic 
culture is very important. We should learn to 
do something well, and learn something new. 
Of course, there is also the culture of abiding 
law. It would be very good to adapt this culture 
in Kyrgyzstan. Currently, legislation as such 
exists on its own, while real life also exists on 
its own. Therefore, the formation of a culture 
of abiding law is also a major issue for us. 
First of all, Kyrgyz should answer the following 
question: what is stronger in this country – a 
law or family relations, a law or a phone call? 
This is very important.
Valentin Bogatyrev: I think it is complete 
nonsense that they are going to write some 
ideology, because ideologies are not written. 
There are many ideological spaces coexisting 
in Kyrgyzstan, and division into our own space 
or that of aliens follows adherence to certain 
ideas. Indeed we deal with four ideas of different 
origins: traditional Kyrgyz ideology, Soviet, 
Western, and, lately, we feel the infl uence of 
Islamic ideology. When I talk about infl uence, 
I do not mean Kyrgyz Islamic culture, which 
is characterized by a particular softness; I 
mean modern Islamic culture in a suffi ciently 
politicized format. This Islamic culture is one 
of the determining ideological factors which 
infl uence ideology.
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What do those writing ideology want? They 
say: we will choose some package and declare 
it a national idea. Immediately I have several 
questions: What principles and what basis 
will guide their choice of sampling? Who will 
decide that specifi cally these or those ideas 
should make up national ideology, and why 
they? It is completely unclear. On what can we 
base it? There are many examples in history. 
You can look backward to the past and rely on 
some cultural values, or you can look forward 
and defi ne what goal we want to achieve. Our 
commission on ideology has not done even this 
work, although it would make understandable 
how and on what principles we will form this 
ideological picture.
There are various ideologies, all of which have 
a right to exist. And there is a question: Why and 
what for? Who will use this or that ideology?
Ideology emerges only when the people face 
desparation. Desparation is a situation in which 
it is impossible to resolve one’s problems with 
the help of available resources and means. It 
seems to me that we are in this very situation, 
and it results in very large activeness in life. 
For instance, Kazakhs are better off; they have 
a lot of money and they do not want to change 
anything, whereas we want to change many 
things. All these talks about ideology, searching 
for a national idea – all of this means that fi nally 
there is a need in the society to answer the 
question: what should we do next? I absolutely 
agree with my colleagues: the main thing is the 
issue of national goals. This is a key issue. How 
can you draft a constitution and start reforms 
without knowing the purpose for which you are 
doing it?! In order to achieve a certain goal, you 
need a certain constitution – for instance, strict 
and authoritarian – there is only a President in 
the country, 
no parliament 
at all. In order 
to achieve a 
different goal, 
you need a 
c o m p l e t e l y 
different constitution – with no President at all, 
but with national kurultai – a grand assembly. 
However, the work being done now is useless, 
a political “game.”
Goals are a very interesting issue. Nazarbaev 
recently stated: “Kazakhstan should be among 
top 50 most developed countries of the world.” 
It is a great goal. The entire country accepted 
this as an idea. What is it based on? There is 
such a notion as Kazakh pretension. These 
are good quality people; these are very 
ambitious people; and it is through ambitions 
that one makes history. How about Kyrgyz? 
What should be the basis, so that we stand up 
and move? I do not have the answer to this 
question. As long as there is no answer to this 
question, all these ideas about a country of 
service, industrial plants, and ethno-museums 
will not go anywhere. We published a book 
titled “Kyrgyzstan 2025,” which has a set of 
strategies. But this projection does not mean 
that we know how to enact it so that something 
would happen and a real ideology would 
emerge, so that it would become a real driving 
force. Besides problematisation, we should be 
able to form a goal, and for that one more thing 
is needed. There is such a notion as an active 
ideological system. A church is an example of an 
active ideological system. This is a mechanism 
with the help of which you can “put” ideas in 
people’s heads. Political parties, though not all, 
are such systems.
Ishenbai Abdurazakov: Like the Party of 
Justice and Progress.
Valentin Bogatyrev: The fi rst word of the 
party’s name is obvious – “justice,” because 
injustice was a driving force on March 24th, 
whereas the word “progress” is not that clear. 
Valentin Bogatyrev 
Director of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies under the President of 
Kyrgyzstan and Adviser to the President of 
Kyrgyzstan
In 1988-91 served as Deputy Minister of 
People’s Education of Kyrgyzstan;
1989-95 – director, co-director of Central 
Asian School of Cultural Politics; 
1995-2002 - director of the Institute for 
Ethnic Politics. Bogatyrev is chairman of the 
Board of Trustees of the European Club in 
Kyrgyzstan. 
Ideology emerges only 
when the people are not 
able to resolve their prob-
lems with the help of avail-
able resources and means.
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You did not mention what you mean by this 
word. If you answer this question, the party 
will immediately move forward, because for 
now our understanding of the word “progress” 
is: “what belonged to you belongs to us now”. 
Those events in Iskra are not an interethnic 
problem, but a problem of “poor hating the 
rich.” This came from the Soviet system.
Nur Omarov (Political scientist): The problem 
of practical implementation of ideology was 
mentioned earlier. Askar Akaev worked on this 
a lot, and with Bakiev coming to power they 
artifi cially set up a commission… Of course, 
I agree that it is useless work to write an 
ideology, but there were different motivations 
for it. Akaev’s national ideology, based on 
the seven precepts of Manas, was born with 
romantic expectations (people who drank 
cognac with Akaev as a professor of physics 
in 1985-86 are still alive, and they remember 
him talking a lot about Kyrgyz and statehood in 
general). As for Bakiev, a product of the Soviet 
party nomenclature system, he has traditional 
motives, and he is guided, in particular, by 
substantiation of the interests of the new ruling 
group. 
 
One of the problems of modern Kyrgyzstan is 
the absence of modernized principles, which 
decreases inner potential. To speak fi guratively, 
Kyrgyzstan resembles a person whose head 
is turned at 90 degrees. What does it mean? 
We are right in saying that there is a need to 
create an ideology which would be accepted 
by our multiethnic population. On the one hand 
actually, we have just started creating a national 
state - mythical statehood that is supposedly 
2200 years old or Manas that we are trying to 
push off from, etc. On the other hand, we have 
to quickly adapt and develop in the world of 
competition and globalization. It is very diffi cult 
for Kyrgyzstan in this regard. On the one hand, 
it is necessary to revive the state, but Akaev’s 
false slogans of the seven precepts of Manas 
were throwing us into a feudal abyss. As a 
result, we have indeed created a feudalized 
state, where progressive principles are just 
thin layer on the bog of feudalism. On the other 
hand, it is necessary to move forward, but how 
is it possible without nourishing a progressive 
environment? All the premises are of external 
impulses. The whole process of democratization 
in the 90s, and even the events of March 24th 
had a certain external impulse to which the 
internal environment reacted inadequately. 
The expectations of those who had given these 
impulses were completely thwarted.
I agree and join you in that ideology is necessary, 
probably as an ideology of co-citizenship. Again, 
the problem is how to create it? A very good 
book was published in 1998 that I wish every 
offi cial had on his desk, including the President. 
The title of this book is “Europe’s Experience for 
Kyrgyzstan.” It is meant for creating countries, 
and it promotes the idea of protestant ethics 
by Max Weber, and in particular, legal basics 
of the sense of justice, as well as the ethics 
of fair business. I think these are the very 
things that are to become a basis for national 
ideology. They cannot be artifi cially inculcated, 
since it requires a considerable period of time 
and effort. I guess in 15-20 years, by the time 
our society develops, that very ideology and 
its preconditions will mature enough to be 
introduced. But for now, every new leader will 
bring a new ideology with him. 
Gulsara Jakupova (Association of 
“Partnership of Professionals for 
Development of Kyrgyzstan”): I have a 
question to Mr. Bogatyrev. You said that ideology 
appears when there is problematisation in the 
society. Indeed, if we take Germany after the 
war, India during colonization by England, or the 
communist regime in USSR, we can see that the 
strongest and most successful ideologies were 
created under conditions of problematisation 
in the society. Germany recovered in a short 
period, India succeeded in overthrowing 
England’s regime in a nonviolent way, and the 
entire capitalist world was the external enemy 
of the USSR. Perhaps, certain enemies should 
be determined so that a successful ideology 
will appear and be practiced.  
We do not have identity; if there is no historical 
documentation and literature, we do not know 
what ethnicity we are, who we are, or what 
blood is running in our veins. Actually, I think 
there is not any ethnicity at all in Central Asia, 
but a mixture of blood just as in the whole 
world. Our big misfortune, our enemy, is 
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immorality – shamelessness. This is the factor 
that resulted in the situation that we have 
today – double standards among political elite. 
Primarily, the country’s leadership says one 
thing, and then they do quite different things. 
Our generation grew up in conditions of double 
standards, and our children are growing up the 
same way. Absence of identity or formation of 
culture, immorality and shamelessness, double 
standards – these are things that keep us from 
breaking through. This is what we have to work 
on, and this will serve as a basis for our national 
ideology.    
Valentin Bogatyrev: The presence of an 
enemy is of course a good motivator. A second 
good motivator is starvation, and a third 
one is national humiliation. There are many 
motivators like these. It seemed that we had 
to bear everything: humiliation, starvation, and 
fear. But how many of you consider gain as an 
enemy? How many of you think that a person 
should not live at the expense of others? After 
all, real life is built in a different way. People 
see that those who steal, lie, and extract live 
well…    
Ishenbai Abdurazakov: We deviate a little bit 
from the historical method when we consider 
such things as a genetic code or cultural code. 
I carefully studied the history and way of life 
of many nations in order to understand why 
Kyrgyz are so lavish. It turns out that generosity 
as a rule is related to underdevelopment 
of market relations. “Stingy capitalists” of 
western countries are the result of commodity-
money relations. That is a refl ection of certain 
differences in values. And the second factor 
is the parallel existence of different norms of 
behavior. We should overcome this inevitable 
historical stage of development. However, 
when we jump over some stages, we acquire 
something that we do not feel in our own skin 
and heart. There were few real communists 
during the Soviet time; they almost did not 
exist. Many people treat democracy as a 
fashion nowadays too; however, they have 
entirely different ideas in their hearts. That is 
why many people, even the educated, say that 
the President is our Padishah, which becomes 
a basis for further reasoning. Once he is a 
Padishah, being a god is also quite possible. 
This is the source for treating the President as 
if he were a Padishah, and this is the source for 
most of our misfortunes. We are talking about 
democracy, but as a result of fl awed practice, it 
becomes an abusive notion. It is our own fault, 
since we distorted all of these ideas. Now we 
are saying that we need to return to authentic 
values of democracy. Our world would have 
become different long ago if we followed 
the Quran or Bible. The point is that double 
standards always existed, and continue to exist. 
As for the unity of moral conceptions, it exists 
only among a very thin stratum of society; the 
entire society never had it. 
Atadjan Yazmuradov (OSCE Academy): 
We have our own approach to this issue in 
our country. It is very interesting for me to 
observe your discourse; this is a generic issue 
for Central Asian countries. Mr. Imanaliev 
mentioned Korea. Korea is a very interesting 
experiment. North and South Korea seem to be 
one country, but at the same time, the results 
are so different. To what extent does our history 
determine our present and future? We say 
“traditional society,” “democracy”… There is a 
theory that society develops stage by stage: 
agricultural, then industrial, and postindustrial. 
Each society has its own system of economic 
relations, and possesses systems of politics 
and general culture accordingly. Attitudes 
towards society, oneself, and the government 
differ at each of the stages.     
Valentin Bogatyrev: The thing is that the world 
lives in a post-democratic space nowadays. 
Democracy is in the past already. What we 
are observing now in developed countries, in 
America, above all, is a post-democratic space. 
They do not have such a notion of democracy 
as we do here. Things that we allow ourselves 
here are impossible in America; it is simply 
impossible.  
Elmira Nogoibaeva (International Institute 
for Strategic Studies): We talk about tribal 
relations and then criticize it as tribalism, 
but at the same time we yearn for respect 
towards seniors. Do you not fi nd that one point 
contradicts the other, since respect towards 
seniors is the very basis of tribal relations? This 
is just a remark. My question is the following: 
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how do you understand ideology? Is it an ideal 
world, an ideal place for a certain nation, or is it 
something rational or, counted, even a kind of 
technological project? 
Atadjan Yazmuradov (OSCE Academy): 
You mentioned the concept of challenge – you 
referred to national humiliation, a negative 
challenge. Some countries respond to the 
challenge and advance up one stage; others 
collapse. Each responds to challenge in a 
different way. Japan is an industrial power that 
has been developing, that has an impulse. They 
had a national idea, and they moved forward 
and developed even before this challenge. 
Muratbek Imanaliev: Movement is not 
universal. What is the difference between the 
Chinese and barbarians? Chinese can overcome 
diffi culties, both natural and manmade. 
Humiliation is a certain obstacle that a nation 
or a human overcomes. For the Japanese, the 
war was a big humiliation. But a much bigger 
humiliation is history of Africa. No matter how 
African intellectuals and politicians understand 
this situation, they cannot do anything. There 
is no movement forward; Africa remains as 
backward as it had been before. None of the 
African countries coped well enough to rise to 
their feet.  
Ishenbai Abdurazakov: Humiliation still needs 
to be realized. The Germans and Japanese 
started the war, stating that they were the 
best nations in the world. Germans thought 
that Aryans are the best of all, and therefore 
are destined to rule the world. Japanese 
considered themselves as Oriental Aryans, and 
therefore had the right to rule the whole of Asia. 
Africans did not have such an idea, and what is 
happening there is not a humiliation for them, 
they do not realize it. Being backward is not a 
humiliation for them, but a natural condition. 
Muratbek Imanaliev: There is a difference 
between Japanese and Kyrgyz. When a 
Japanese says, “I am Japanese,” this is national 
ideology. When we say, “we are Kyrgyz,” this is 
not national ideology yet, because we are not 
simply Kyrgyz, we are also someone else. This 
is the problem with tribal relations.  
Ainura Cholponkulova (Association 
of “Partnership of Professionals for 
Development of Kyrgyzstan”): I would like 
to go back to the question of identity. I guess 
you are right that we just have not formed as 
a nation, and hence cannot develop. I will not 
compare us with other countries, but look at 
the lives of ethnic minorities who live next to us 
– Koreans, Chinese and Uigurs. Again, we are 
back to national values. For example, Koreans 
value collectivism in its positive meaning. They 
start doing business with whole families quite 
successfully. The same is true with Uigurs. In 
our country, where it is pretty diffi cult to live 
even for ethnic Kyrgyz, other ethnicities live 
well nevertheless. When ethnic Kyrgyz start 
doing business, then within some time our 
friends and relatives start quarreling with us, 
fi ghting, etc. It is all due to our laziness and 
envy. If our neighbor, an ethnic Kyrgyz, is richer 
than we are, then it is somehow bad, and we 
are discontent, rather than being glad that there 
is one more rich person in Kyrgyzstan. 
And there is a related question for everyone: 
how long will we think of what to push off from? 
Perhaps we need some pragmatic goal, since 
everyone wants to live well, to see tangible 
results.  We need a to identify a goal which will 
meet modern market demands, and to move 
towards it. 
Muratbek Imanaliev: I think the biggest 
problem at present for the Kyrgyz nation is 
emigration of the population; and unfortunately, 
this process will continue. This problem results 
from a distorted policy of the government – I 
wonder at the fact that the government created 
a special agency to facilitate emigration of 
people. This is a striking fact; there is not such 
a thing elsewhere, even in Africa. It is obvious 
that none of them will return. We should try to 
improve our economy and create jobs instead 
of looking for jobs abroad. As it is the able-
bodied part of the population which leaves, 
this sort of exodus will result in what has been 
happening for centuries in Africa – export of 
the most capable men and women from Africa. 
And given the fact that we are not 75 million 
like the Turks, but just over three million, then 
I think that a search for some kind of identity, a 
national idea or the like, will be a very diffi cult 
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process. Plus, we have to take into account that 
a quarter of the Kyrgyz population is already not 
living in this country, while the rest is preparing 
to leave,
 
Valentin Bogatyrev: I think Mr. Imanaliev is 
both right and wrong. The real goal is to live 
well, and therefore the quickest solution to this 
problem is to leave for somewhere else. There 
are no well paying jobs here like in Kazakhstan, 
Moscow, or London. Maybe the state is right 
in doing something to make the exodus of its 
citizens civilized, so that they will have at least 
certain rights abroad. Although, in principle, this 
emigration certainly is a washout of the best, 
most active part of the population.
It is not duty bound, but I want to say that now 
I understand what Bakiev thinks about this 
issue. At least he says that today we should 
open everything here that can be opened by 
using local resources and raw material, so 
that plants and factories will work. Of course, 
this way you will not be able to solve all of the 
existing problems, because there are serious 
problems with agriculture too. We gave land 
for private ownership; as a result, we started 
over producing agriculture, and now we face 
the problem of exporting it. But we cannot work 
in external markets, as we have never done it 
before and we cannot do it. It is very diffi cult 
to join world production lines. Therefore, the 
solution to the problem lies in developing 
directions which would allow people to live and 
earn well as they deserve. 
Ishenbai Abdurazakov: Envy is not our 
monopoly. It is a universal human phenomenon; 
it is the same everywhere. There is nothing 
wrong if there is solidarity at the personal level, 
especially in villages where the well-off will be 
helping worse-off relatives; it is normal. We 
talk about the harm of clan politics only at the 
government level, when incompetent people 
occupy executive offi ces.
I agree that there is a fl ight of qualifi ed citizens, 
as well as merely able-bodied. It is a reality; it is 
due to the hardships of life. But I do not share the 
pessimism of Mr. Imanaliev, as I am sure that not 
all of those who leave stay abroad. Of course, 
provided that we will have normal conditions 
for doing business and for working, a good part 
of them will return. We could gradually make 
up for basic fundamentals. At the moment, the 
main shortcoming is that the Penal Code and 
other laws are not being enforced. We declared 
a juridical society, but laws are not enforced. 
Even an established business becomes an 
object of the arbitrariness of some people. A 
state functioning in accordance with law, with 
independent, impartial courts, and with all other 
features of democracy did not properly evolve 
here.
 
Yes, we have problems with processing 
agricultural produce. As a result, although we 
could produce many of our own products, we 
consume imported juice of dubious quality. No 
matter how much we talk about substituting 
imports, there is no corresponding economic 
policy. Even though the new leadership poses 
economic issues, it does it like the director of a 
Soviet enterprise. There is almost no talk about 
implementing real market mechanisms. If we 
want to develop not only in political aspects, but 
also economic, then let us act logically. We do 
not have logic, and nothing changed after March 
24th. The people, the leaders of this revolution, 
did not think of changing our politics. Our task, 
the reason why we get together and discuss 
these issues, is to develop our country in the 
right way – not just orally but in practice. That 
is when our people will have the opportunity to 
work normally. That is when, perhaps, those 
who have left will return, and the youth will 
stay here after receiving their degrees. We 
should talk not about some ideology, but about 
preserving these cadres and keeping them 
busy at home. This is our future.
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IPP: Sultan Akimovich, you head the newly 
established Ministry of Culture. Please tell 
us about the functions and authorities of this 
ministry. What are its objectives and tasks? 
Why did the necessity to assign culture to the 
authority of a separate ministry emerge? 
Sultan Raev: During the last 15 years, the 
sphere of culture became second-grade in our 
country. Not a single penny was allocated for the 
development of culture; there was absolutely no 
new staging in the theater of opera and ballet 
during these years. In our villages, culture is in 
a very deplorable state.   We have a very weak 
normative and legal framework: there are only 
six laws on culture, and the basic law on culture 
adopted in 1993 is morally outdated. 
If there is no structural body in the government 
responsible for culture, it is hopeless. Even 
such a small country as the Altai republic has 
its ministry of culture. A ministry holds a certain 
status, and I believe that this kind of approach 
by the government to address this issue is the 
right one.  Our philosophy is that culture is 
needed not just for the sake of culture, but for 
the people. 
IPP: Lately there is much discourse about the 
national ideology. The Ministry of Culture, I 
assume, is directly involved in this discussion. 
Please tell us, what is the problem here – why did 
we take up the ideology issue so zealously? 
Sultan Raev: When we talk about ideology, a 
certain stereotyped understanding of this word 
is triggered. Ideology, above all, is a system of 
ideas. For us it is now important to defi ne what 
kinds of ideas are necessary for the development 
of the country. When one speaks of ideology, 
it is always associated with the communist 
ideology. However, there is a dramatic 
difference between what we want to create and 
the communist ideas. Currently, globalization 
processes are under way and cultural borders 
are disappearing. Whether we want it or not, 
we will live by the economic laws of the West, 
which is the market economy. However, for 
Kyrgyz it is crucial to preserve our nation and 
state, and the essence of the ideology is that 
we must preserve our language and culture. 
For example, Malaysia and Indonesia are 
experiencing the same problems: they remain 
under the infl uence of China. We can simply 
get lost in the globalization process. Moreover, 
there are some dangerous tendencies. 
UNESCO published a document last year in 
which the Kyrgyz language was included in the 
group of disappearing languages. 
IPP: You are a member of a special 
governmental commission for development of 
a new ideology. How is the work progressing, 
and are there any results?
Sultan Raev: We held meetings and 
roundtables. There are several versions of the 
ideology concept. There is a version prepared 
by Sarygulov, one by the Academy of Sciences, 
and one prepared by me… 
IPP: What is your concept about?
Sultan Raev: Ideology is not a declarative 
document. The Constitution should be the basis 
of any ideology. Ideology should defi ne the 
major developmental directions of Kyrgyzstan. 
Our state above all is a democratic one. The 
government should respect human rights, we 
should enjoy freedom of expression, and we 
should live in a legal state. The ideology should 
refl ect what is provided for by the Constitution. 
For me, the major interest of the concept is the 
idea of preserving our statehood. 
GUEST OF THE ISSUE
SULTAN RAEV:  
“THE STATE SHOULD PRESERVE AND DEVELOP THE NATIONAL CULTURE 
– THAT IS AN IDEOLOGY FOR US” 
The guest of the issue is Minister of Culture of the Kyrgyz Republic Sultan Raev. He is a 
well known Kyrgyz playwright and journalist. Today, Sultan Raev heads a newly established 
ministry aimed at reviving the national culture. He is also a member of the governmental 
commission for development of the new national ideology.
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IPP: What do you include in the notion of the 
national idea, which will unite the whole nation? 
What do you put the emphasis on – the Kyrgyz 
or the Kyzgyzstanis?  
Sultan Raev: Our state is not a mono-ethnic 
one. All – the Kyrgyz and the non-Kyrgyz alike 
– are citizens of one state: Kyrgyzstan.  Human 
rights, the rights of each citizen, are uppermost. 
All should be equal. This is an issue of state 
and national unity. Each citizen should live in a 
decent society. 
IPP: What should unite all Kyrgyzstanis? 
Sultan Raev: “Kyrgyzstan is our Homeland” – 
this should unite us all. The state is not an empty 
word; the state – is I. Each person should have 
this feeling. Each person should feel his or her 
responsibility before the Homeland. This is not a 
vain slogan – this should be an everyday motto 
for each person. 
The Seven Legacies of Manas is a surrogate, 
which was imposed from above. I have read 
thoroughly the epos, and I did not fi nd seven 
legacies. People should fi rst of all believe in the 
ideology, and belief is a very complex thing. 
IPP: But now the concept is being developed by 
the top again. Are we not repeating the mistake 
by passing the idea from top to bottom?
Sultan Raev: We have carried out a sociological 
survey that covered total of 27 000 people 
representing different population strata. Ninety 
six per cent of the respondents answered that 
we need an ideology. However, as to what kind 
of one, opinions differ. We traveled to the regions 
and discussed these questions. Everyone says 
that we need an ideology. An individual without a 
guideline is dreadful. It does not matter whether 
the initiative comes from the bottom or the top. 
If a concept will be proposed, we will conduct 
nation-wide discussions. We should defi ne 
guidelines in which society should live, and to 
where it should go. 
IPP: What is the status of the concept 
development?
Sultan Raev: Currently, there are several 
versions of the concept developed; a working 
commission is reviewing them together with the 
Jogorku Kenesh. Probably some combinations 
will be worked out…
IPP: How can a common national idea be 
developed when we do not have a common 
information fi eld? In some regions of Kyrgyzstan, 
not a single Kyrgyz television channel 
broadcasts, and people watch 5-6 channels of 
the neighboring countries. 
Sultan Raev: You are right. This is more an 
issue of information security. A comprehensive 
approach is needed here. It is not enough 
simply to draft a national ideology. Development 
of the concept constitutes only 3% of the work, 
while 97% consists of practical steps for its 
implementation. I am opposed to mandatory 
publication of the adopted concept in mass 
media. We are just defi ning the priorities of 
what kind of society we will live in further. For 
instance, the national idea in Russia is to save 
the federation, which is a very important issue. 
National ideological documents are being 
developed for Ukraine as well, and I believe that 
it is time for us to think about the future too. 
IPP: Do you remember, once an opinion that 
Kyrgyzstan could disappear as a state was 
voiced in Pozner’s program…
Sultan Raev: This is nonsense. Lately, the 
problem of “south vs. north” is often discussed, 
but I think that the division will not take place. 
On the contrary, we should become united. The 
common people never talk about the south-north 
divide; this is a policy issue. There are only 2.5 
million Kyrgyz; this is like a small micro-district of 
Shanghai. Therefore, the major issue for us is to 
preserve our statehood. 
IPP: You said that a concept is an internal 
document, which defi nes the general direction. 
What should the government do to implement 
its provisions?  
Sultan Raev: The government should preserve 
and develop the national culture; this is an 
ideology per se for us. The ideology is realized 
step by step, and one should not expect results 
in a year. A systematic approach should be 
adopted everywhere: in culture, sport, and 
education. 
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APPOINTMENT PROBLEMS IN CIVIL SERVICE
A roundtable on “Appointment problems in civil service” was held at the Institute for Public Policy 
on 31 January 2006. Jantoro Satybaldiev, Member of Jogorku Kenesh (Parliament) of the Kyrgyz 
Republic and Narynbek Kasymov, Deputy Director of the Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic on Civil 
Service were invited as main speakers. The topic was not chosen randomly: as many experts 
argue, inconsistency and incompetence of appointments in civil service have become a major 
political problem. The excerpts of the roundtable proceedings are provided below.
Jantoro Satybaldiev: Everyone agrees that 
personnel matters. Under a normal personnel 
policy, when you hire competent staff you are 
ensured success. But if we conduct fl awed 
personnel reform, then we get corresponding 
consequences. The present administration is 
repeating the same mistakes as the previous 
one. You have observed this in the example of 
the governors of Jalalabad and Talas Oblasts. 
Very rough mistakes were committed here. 
Although, the President later found a different 
solution, which was better than the initial one. 
However, the problem of rotating the governors 
of these oblasts could have been resolved 
earlier. In Talas, they even started discussing 
whether all southern offi cials should resign. 
I see two reasons for this confl ict. Firstly, 
Jeenbekov was one of the initiators of taking 
over the oblast administration in 2005, and 
considers himself as one of the authors of the 
revolution of March 24th. Therefore, the option 
similar to what Akaev resorted to in dealing with 
his governors and ministers did not work. The 
current President and his administration should 
remember the way they came to power.
These mistakes repeat in other instances as 
well. For example, we could not restore order 
at Karakeche enterprise for several months, 
which damaged not only the economy, but also 
our image. Before, Karakeche would supply 
the Thermal Heating System with some 60-
80,000 tons of coal annually. Having failed to 
resolve the problem with Motuev, we supported 
Kazakhstan’s economy instead.
The scenario is the same with the Teleradio 
Corporation: there was a national television 
– now it became a state television, and they 
consider it a reform. The “reform” was only in 
changing disobedient vice-presidents of the 
company. The government is just declaring 
further democratization of mass media, 
whereas in reality everything is going back to 
the previous state of affairs.
I met with the workers of the railway. All 
they wanted was to have a professional 
administration….
Although we have an Agency on Civil Service, 
there was not a general personnel policy under 
the previous administration, nor does the 
Jantoro Satybaldiev 
Member of Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz 
Republic. 
In 1999-2000 served as Minister of 
Transportation and Communication of the 
Kyrgyz Republic.
He also served as a Mayor of Osh city in 
2001-2003, and Special Representative of 
the President on energy security with the 
status of deputy Prime Minister. 
IPP: Your plans as the Minister of Culture?
Sultan Raev:  Interesting activities are included 
in the program of 2006. Following our initiative, 
a universal festival of eposes will be held. The 
fi rst jazz festival with participation by groups 
from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan will 
be held on April 20-23, 2006. Jazz groups from 
America, Germany, France and Russia will 
also attend – we have received confi rmations 
already. As the festival is an international 
one, this means we should conduct it at the 
corresponding level. My friends from Moscow 
are helping. 
In addition, I am fi nishing my work on a novel 
– “The Last Prophet.” I started it in 1994 and 
now I am about to fi nish it.
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current administration have it. Competitions 
that are being held to fi ll vacancies could be 
called prearranged, as the only public aspect of 
them is vacancy announcements for positions 
of secretaries of state, whereas their selection 
is a matter of technology. I welcomed the 
creation of the institute of Civil Service Agency; 
however, the institute of secretaries of state is 
premature for Kyrgyzstan. To introduce it, we 
have to change the system of government. 
The previous administration was good in 
manipulating with catchy words; the new 
administration continues along that path. The 
essence has not changed. Basically, the offi ces 
of a minister and a secretary of state are parallel; 
they compete with each other. A minister is a 
political offi ce, whereas a secretary of state 
decides on personnel policy and fi nance.
Unfortunately, we do not train personnel, 
although there is an Academy of Management 
under the President, which I think has good 
resources and it is possible to train specialists 
there. Those who graduated from this 
Academy hope that they will make a career, but 
unfortunately, many of them are unemployed. 
Even if they are employed, they do not work 
according to their major. Unqualifi ed people 
are appointed to high-ranking offi ces. As an 
example, I could mention the recent formation 
of the Cabinet and appointment of directors 
of state agencies. Among these ministers and 
directors, one may name only two or three 
persons who are ready to fulfi ll their duties. The 
Prime Minister does not have complete power 
over them; therefore, there is an open rivalry 
between him and the chairman of the National 
Security Service. In this case, one or both of 
them should resign.
Narynbek Kasymov: Yes, indeed the problem 
of personnel policy emerged not today, but still 
exists from before. We could talk more about 
problems: failures while forming a Cabinet 
and making appointments. I think the main 
problem is that there is no established system 
of working with personnel. Such a system was 
built before, during the Soviet times: selection, 
placement, and education of personnel – all of 
these conditions were observed. A trade union 
trained its own personnel, the Communist Union 
of the Youth its own members. The Party system 
had a very wide network. I worked in youth 
communist bodies. There was very rigorous 
training, and only those who underwent those 
trainings were selected and further trained as 
offi cers for leadership of Party organs. Back 
then of course, there was very strict discipline. 
If you had any fault, you received a reprimand, 
and then you were deprived of your Party-
membership card, which meant the end of your 
career. With independence, this system was 
destroyed. “Laboratory assistants” and their 
relatives came to leadership.
All of us worked with that team. I would like to 
note that the fi rst president, Mr. Akaev, used 
virtually all personnel potential. His only fault 
was that he appointed his friends and relatives 
to high-ranking positions, and in the end, his 
entire family started ruling the country. That is 
when the personnel policy failed. A revolution 
broke out in March, and the whole of the last 
year abounded with “revolutions.” Then the 
Cabinet was formed until fall. 
I have spent my entire life working on personnel 
issues, and therefore I know that pressure on 
the part of members of parliament played a big 
role in the recent appointments. This team was 
made of representatives of several political 
forces, all of them pursuing their interests, 
claiming that they were part of the revolution 
and therefore that their people will work here 
or there. There is tremendous pressure, and 
I wonder how you can talk about competency 
and professionalism in such a situation. Mr. 
Satybaldiev is right in pointing out that some 
political offi ces are occupied by absolutely 
incompetent people.
While debating the structure of the Cabinet, 
many MPs did not want to include the Civil 
Narynbek Kasymov 
Deputy Director of the Agency of the Kyrgyz 
Republic on Civil Service. 
In 2002-2005 – he served as the chief expert 
of the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies under the President of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, projects support department.
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and control unit in the administration of the 
President of the Kyrgyz Republic
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Service Agency. However, it is demanded 
by international donors. When I worked in 
the administration of the President in 1998-
1999, we were the fi rst to study international 
experience. Why is there such an agency within 
the structure of a Cabinet, and why were offi ces 
of secretaries of state established? I will explain 
the rationale. Under Akaev, there were frequent 
changes of Cabinet: a new minister would fi re 
all of the old staff and hire only his relatives. 
The next minister would do exactly the same. 
But the new staff would not know how to work. 
Just imagine a veterinary surgeon working in 
the chancellery…. That is when information 
leaks and petitions remain unaddressed.
Bureaucracy has both positive and negative 
features. In the West for instance, bureaucracy 
performs superbly and benefi ts society. It is 
obvious that they have a different history and 
a different attitude toward law. If you read 
our Law on Civil Service, it is near ideal. 
However, its implementation is plagued with 
our kyrgyzchylyk, whereby we try to bypass 
any article or any law; and it is already in our 
blood. The Law makes it clear why secretaries 
of state were introduced: they make sure 
that administrative positions are stable, that 
competent staff is hired, that there is no 
tribalism, clan politics, or nepotism within staff, 
that employees are not abused or fi red when 
there is a change of political leadership, and 
that administrative resources are preserved. 
Such goals and objectives are good, tested in 
many developed countries. However, with the 
appointment of political leadership, even at the 
level of departments and so forth there is again 
kyrgyzchylyk, and you cannot get away from 
it. You understand that now we have problems 
with employment: there are many unemployed, 
and it pays well to work in such ministries and 
agencies….
Our Agency has been working for a year and 
half, and I can claim at least that the new 
leadership is trying to enhance its role and 
prestige. We face very big tasks. We have 
already held seminars for civil servants in 
Bishkek and central organs of Chui oblast. Now 
we will hold them in the south: Naryn and Talas. 
Based on my own example, I could say that 
before there was a completely different system 
of retraining personnel, and now we are trying 
to switch to a new system. At present, there 
is no training of personnel – we have totally 
untrained people – whereas before, one had 
to move through all stages of chancellery work 
and work as chairman of the rayon (district) 
executive committee, second secretary of the 
rayon party committee, then go through the 
school of the Central Committee somewhere 
at the level of department head, and only then 
would one be promoted to an independent 
offi ce and a position as the fi rst secretary of an 
oblast (provincial) party committee. 
Jantoro Satybaldiev: Had the President or the 
head of his administration invited Jeenbekov 
and explained the motivations behind the 
rotation, everything would be different. It should 
not be done the way they did it – at the end of a 
meeting, they unexpectedly announce that he 
was fi red. 
We are failing in training personnel. Why was 
the Civil Service Agency created? Intentions 
were good, yes, but a corrupt system of 
civil service was put in place from the very 
beginning. We take as examples advanced 
states like Holland, America, and England, with 
centuries long traditions, but we are not ready 
for this! We cannot even form a parliament 
with party lists. We do not have a system of 
training personnel; for fourteen years we have 
crippled many people. Under Akaev you were 
in charge of personnel in the administration of 
the President – you were also a part of it just 
like me. 
Narynbek Kasymov: There is something 
being done. While working in the organizational 
department, I have employed the fi rst graduates 
of the Academy of Management. The following 
year there were many willing to study at 
the Academy. Later they stopped dealing 
with employment, and now there are many 
unemployed graduates. So much money was 
spent on their training, and it turned out that it 
was for no purpose.
Now there is a different issue. Our Agency 
reaches out to donors who will help in training 
and retraining civil servants; presently the 
Japanese government is considering a possibility 
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of training twenty civil servants in Japan. The 
entire leadership of our Agency was changed, 
and we set feasible tasks. Now we have started 
forming a national personnel reserve. I was a 
member of a selection commission on placing 
college graduates on the national personnel 
reserve. What bright students we have! These 
advanced individuals know languages; they 
are open, straightforward, and fearless. We 
have placed eleven graduates on the national 
personnel reserve. They should gain certain 
working experience; they should be sent for 
training; and we will fi ll vacancies from this 
reserve. Out of 22 civil servants of Issykkul 
Oblast, we selected fi ve. Requirements are 
very tough – tests and interviews. 
Today we have gained the President’s 
endorsement; time will show how all of this 
will be implemented, but we are going to be 
persistent and will not allow any revival of the 
previous system. In Issykkul for instance, we 
have gathered 130 civil servants who deal with 
personnel issues. We trained them on fi lling 
out declaration forms and other things. We will 
keep working, as there is a lot to be done. We 
will try to improve the situation in this important 
sphere.
Jantoro Satybaldiev: Mr. Kasymov, train 
civil servants – most importantly – not to take 
bribes. I think that it should be done in this 
way – that civil servants are accountable and 
transparent; any state offi cial should be elected, 
and only then will we get positive results. And 
for this purpose we had a very good school 
– the decentralization of government. We 
made village administration elected; there was 
political decentralization. If we were to carry out 
administrative and fi nancial decentralization, 
it would be a very good school for career 
growth. If we were to carry out administrative 
and territorial reforms sooner, we would start 
electing heads of aimaks (provinces), and 
then we would have much better training of 
personnel than today. 
If we do not carry out a reform of wages, then 
your secretaries of state and those placed on 
the reserve will take bribes. You said wages are 
good in ministries and agencies. Do you know 
how much a minister makes? 200 US dollars. 
Those who come to him to solve their problems 
receive ten times less, but he still looks fi rst at 
their hands. There will not be order under such 
a system in civil service. 
During a recent parliamentary hearing on 
the work of law enforcement agencies, one 
offi cial, a general, said that he appointed his 
subordinate for a good position because his 
father is a general. That is the principle guiding 
the staffi ng of civil servants. How about others 
who do not have a general for a father?
Emil Kalmatov: Mr. Kasymov, what does 
your Agency have to do with the appointment 
of akims and governors? Is there any formal 
procedure for interaction between your Agency 
and the administration of the President?  
Narynbek Kasymov: Our Agency does not 
have anything to do with appointment or rotation 
of governors, as these are political offi ces. We 
work only with administrative offi ces, starting 
from secretaries of state and below.
Emil Kalmatov: So, it turns out that the 
administration of the President appoints them, 
and they themselves staff their team, i.e. you 
are not allowed to be part of the selection 
procedure. Then what is the point of having your 
agency? Now they say that only natives of one 
rayon are working at “Manas” airport. Young 
specialists who have worked there for several 
years are either being fi red or oppressed; their 
salaries are cut, and they are forced to leave. 
You prepare and train specialists, but they 
leave for Kazakhstan or elsewhere. It turns out 
that you are wasting money, investing not for 
the sake of our country.
Elnura Osmonalieva (Students Union of 
Kyrgyzstan): How does the mechanism of 
the reserve work at all? How do you employ 
graduates: you recommend them or send the 
list of them to someone? Do you divide into 
ranks those who recently graduated or who are 
already working as civil servants? 
Narynbek Kasymov: The national personnel 
reserve is just being formed, and we are trying to 
place on reserve genuinely promising personnel. 
Each institution of higher education submits to 
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us their list of graduates with distinction and 
activists. Each civil service agency refers to 
us their promising personnel who may occupy 
positions of leadership tomorrow. We have 
an agreement with the administration of the 
President. We will be training them – we are 
planning to send 20 people to Japan, 15 to 
European states, and the rest will be trained 
locally at the Academy of Management. Each 
ministry and agency reports on openings, and 
we will fi ll those vacancies from the national 
personnel reserve.
Chinara Omurkulova (Resident Director 
of IREX): This spring, IREX, along with the 
Association of Professionals for the Development 
of Kyrgyzstan, organized a meeting with Kulov. 
We invited alumni of many exchange programs, 
i.e. people who studied or interned in the best 
American institutions of higher education. A call 
made by Kulov was the result of that meeting. 
Later, I asked many participants whether they 
had submitted applications to the Civil Service 
Agency. And everyone replied that there is no 
point, as the old system is still in place; that it 
is not worth going there and becoming a cog 
in the old system. And this is true. There is no 
point of attracting fresh, smart heads into the old 
system in order to get an obsolete “product.”
A second issue: tasks facing the country are 
so intricate, multifaceted and complex, and 
therefore concentrating power in one hand is 
unthinkable. Take a look at how management 
tasks are accomplished in our agencies. It 
is called “heroic leadership” – when a leader 
single-handedly deals with all problems and 
tasks. Meanwhile, all his subordinates are 
walking elsewhere, resting…. In reality, it is 
imperative to transfer part of one’s leadership to 
other people, to trust them. But for this purpose, 
people should clearly defi ne their mission. The 
problem of personnel we are discussing lies 
in the absence of the vision of the country’s 
development in general. For instance, the 
Bishkek Business Club has got a great vision 
of this development, and now the main task 
of the Club is to share this vision with every 
member of the society, so that every member 
of our society shares this vision, and in every 
workplace these tasks are realized. 
As for personnel … according to my activities, I 
meet with people who studied abroad. Many of 
them are already working abroad – independent 
of Kyrgyzstan, on their own, as they are indeed 
smart heads. They often tell me that basically 
no one from our leadership is interested in them. 
And even when delegations from Kyrgyzstan 
travel abroad, they are afraid of these young 
specialists, as if they are spies. This is the legacy 
of totalitarianism, when everyone is viewed as a 
spy instead of gathering information needed for 
Kyrgyzstan. It hurts our country, as gathering 
information means also working with people, 
with personnel. Besides, there is a large group 
of great people (mainly middle-aged) who 
have gained considerable experience working 
in international organizations and projects. 
These people know what the system of internal 
control in an organization is. They know how 
to avoid problems of nepotism. They know 
what internal control of fi nances is, that it is 
forbidden for the same hands to reach into a 
purse. They know the system of management 
which exists in international organizations (as 
a rule, those organizations which come to work 
in Kyrgyzstan have clearly defi ned procedures 
of fi nance and human resources). It appears to 
me that these people should not be ignored.
Since there are not many vacancies as you noted, 
the main task is to establish some successful 
entities within ministries and agencies in order 
to aggregate and accumulate this knowledge: 
the experience of those people who have 
returned after their studies and are now living 
here. Besides, we cannot ignore people who are 
being admitted to universities abroad on their 
own. A great number of our people are studying 
abroad, but their academic work – papers and 
dissertations – are not used. However, with the 
help of those academic papers and student 
research, we could accumulate expansive 
analytical potential for our agencies, because 
these students are using great libraries, and 
they have access to all subscriptions, to all 
world databases. We should use the experience 
of these people in order to change the current 
situation in Kyrgyzstan.
Muratbek Imanaliev: Good specialists and 
good management will be in demand when 
there is a normal public administration system. 
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At the present stage of our development, a 
problem of world outlook has emerged: are we 
able to govern ourselves? This is not a rhetorical 
question, and the answer is not defi nite either. 
As the system of public administration was not 
established in this country, there is no demand 
for outstanding personnel with degrees from 
Harvard, London School of Business, etc. The 
problem is that 15 years ago communist or 
totalitarian vojdism (authoritarian leadership) 
changed to liberal vojdism. We failed to create 
a presidential system. Characteristic features of 
vojdism are: permissiveness of the President; 
vertical and horizontal integration; ruling clans, 
tribes, certain regions, and localities through 
relatives, associates, etc. Given such a system, 
there is no need in personnel with degrees from 
Oxford and Harvard. It is enough to graduate 
from any university or just to buy a degree in 
order to get a job. Anything associated with 
the personnel agency is merely an attempt 
at disguise, because neither this agency, nor 
the Academy of Management, nor the national 
personnel reserve, nor those people studying 
abroad have anything to do with personnel 
policy or forming a corps of public offi cials.
The main issue is: what is stronger in this 
country – law or family bonds? This is the 
issue we should address, because both former 
and current leaders, unfortunately, are not 
presidents in the classical understanding of this 
offi ce; both are vojds. Both fail to understand 
that a President is a person who has to regulate 
fi rst of all himself. 
Ainura Cholponkulova (UNDP): For the last 
15 years, donor assistance has been directed 
at training civil servants as well, which is also 
a component of personnel policy. The target 
groups for trainings have been employees of 
junior and middle levels. However, the problem 
is that former party offi cials, functionaries who 
have worked under the Soviet system of state 
apparatus, came to power. They came with 
old knowledge, supplemented by kyrgyzism, 
tribalism, and regionalism. Therefore, I think 
that now the donor assistance should be 
directed at training high-ranking offi cials of all 
levels. 
And another issue: I myself worked as a civil 
servant, and I noticed that the politicians that 
I worked with are not inclined to training. They 
have a stereotype that if I am a governor, 
Member of Parliament or minister, then I know 
everything, and there is nothing for which to be 
trained. Whereas in foreign countries, there is 
a system of continuing education for all levels 
of civil servants. There are programs for junior 
and middle levels, as well as for high-ranking 
offi cials. As it appears to me, the problem 
is that you train only junior and middle level 
personnel. 
Upon returning from training abroad, the majority 
of my former colleagues leave the civil service 
due to low salary and lack of career growth. Many 
of them leave for international organizations 
or go abroad, where they are offered better 
employment. Thus, the old system dominates 
and prevents growth of junior and middle level 
civil servants. Therefore, today our politicians 
and state offi cials, including the President and 
Prime Minister, should not be shy to be trained 
in new technologies, communications, political 
leadership, managing personnel, human 
resources and so forth. 
We talk a lot about the importance of economic 
and political development in strategy. While 
building plans for their future, South Korea 
and India have included the formation of new 
technocratic bureaucracy into their plans. 
South Korea still keeps sending its promising 
leaders abroad to acquire education, and they 
return to work in companies and civil service. 
Today these countries are going through a 
stage of rapid growth! As for us, we rather had 
such a program as “Cadres of XXI Century,” 
but nobody cared about our fellows abroad, 
and nobody needed them here. For instance, in 
authoritarian Uzbekistan there is a similar state 
program: fellows sign a contract with ACCELS, 
an American educational program, according 
to which graduates must return to their home 
country, where they are immediately offered a 
position with the civil service with a commitment 
for three years. 
Whereas in our country, in response to 
Kulov’s appeal, only one person out of 200 
applied, because they were offered such 
strange positions. Our guys – managers and 
directors of various projects – who administer 
resources worth 200 thousand to one million 
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dollars, they write grant proposals, they have 
great experience working in international 
organizations, and they are offered such a low 
salary in the civil service. They have already 
grown up beyond this. 
Recently, while discussing the concept of foreign 
policy, I was very surprised to see that there are 
many elderly experts in the expert group. But 
we should openly and honestly tell them that 
now we have to involve more young people with 
fresh ideas, as we are living in a market where 
we have to earn by ourselves. However, our 
state apparatus, represented by high-ranking 
offi cials, seems to be living according to some 
Kyrgyz management – we cannot even call it 
Soviet. Therefore, in my opinion, we have to 
create advisory councils that would include 
young professionals, and the older generation 
has to learn to listen to us because we are the 
ones who are going to live further. 
Emil Kalmatov: Soon the parliament will be 
considering the annual budget. Could you 
somehow in connection to this event raise a 
problem of personnel policy? For instance, 
it is well known that the administration of the 
President is a huge structure that requires 
expansive resources to maintain its activities. 
Is it possible to make a connection between 
personnel policy and the national budget, or are 
these two things entirely separate from each 
other? 
Jantoro Satybaldiev: The administration 
of the President declared reduction of some 
departments up to ten percent, others up to 40 
percent. But this is not likely to happen. Since 
we do not defi ne the structure, the only leverage 
of infl uence is approving the budget. We want 
to eliminate duplicating structures, to cut 
expenditures rather than personnel. Therefore, 
we decided to cut funding.
Shair Juraev (IPP): My question is concerning 
the Agency. You do a good job by posting on a 
website the income declarations of politicians. 
Are there any sanctions on those who fail to do 
that? 
Narynbek Kasymov: No. Only 38 percent of 
MPs turned in their income declarations, the rest 
do not want to do that. 
Jantoro Satybaldiev: I think we have to declare 
expenses rather than incomes. We show our 
incomes, but drive such fancy cars…. 
Emil Kalmatov: To solve the problem, you 
suggest decentralization and election of 
governors and akims, and nothing more. 
How realistic it is that a parliamentary form 
of government can solve all of the problems 
concerning personnel policy? 
Jantoro Satybaldiev: I agree that 75 MPs will 
not be able to govern the state; it is impossible. 
We have to change the system. If we declare a 
parliamentary system of government, we have 
to create integrity of institutions and laws. 
Damir Bisembin (Partnership of Young 
Professionals for Development of 
Kyrgyzstan): In my opinion, decentralization 
and election of akims is not enough. First of all, it 
is necessary to raise the prestige of civil servants 
and the civil service. A person working in the 
civil service tries not to advertise it, whereas 
a person working for international project or 
joint venture is proud of that. We do not have 
resources to raise the salaries of civil servants; 
hence, maybe we have to raise their prestige 
fi rst of all. For instance, give some privileges or 
offer certain benefi ts…. Mr. Imanaliev, I have a 
question for you since you are a former offi cial 
who worked for a long time in the ministry, and 
are now working in the non-governmental sector. 
In your opinion, how can we, without raising 
salaries, attract to the civil service those young 
and talented specialists who graduated from the 
foreign universities and have great experience (I 
mean middle aged, 30-40 years old)? How can 
it be done so that they would be happy to join 
the civil service and use all their knowledge and 
skills in their work?
Muratbek Imanaliev: It is diffi cult to invent a 
“remedy” to solve this problem. The only thing 
I can state, given terrifying poverty in a country 
where there is no budget and no resources at 
all, the only way to solve this problem is not a 
material aspect, but spirituality, patriotism. I will 
cite an example. (Of course, for this purpose 
they employ not the best methods of bringing 
people up, but I think it also should be done.) 
South Korea lagged behind North Korea in 
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terms of basic indexes; it was a less developed 
agricultural region. What did Korean leaders do? 
They staked on Korean nationalism. They sent 
people to study under American and European 
grants, but with a condition that nationalistically 
or patriotically minded individuals voluntarily 
returned to Korea. Of course, some of them 
remained abroad. However, one should 
not forget about the system of economic 
responsibility for parents and relatives that 
exists there. 
As for us, the majority of people who graduate 
from western universities do not return. Two 
percent of Kazakh citizens with western 
education return to Kazakhstan. I do not know 
about the situation in Uzbekistan; they probably 
use other measures since it is a state with 
dictatorial elements of government. 
Of course, the fi nancial interest of people is 
an important element, but there is no money. 
Should we count on Soros like Georgians? It is 
abnormal when a Prime Minister receives his 
salary from a foreigner. 
The problem is that, unfortunately, we do not 
have a system of fostering patriotism; the 
state does not work on cultivating a spirit of 
homeland in its citizens. While communicating 
with students of American University – Central 
Asia, where I work, I have found out that few 
want to stay in the country, although all of 
them are representatives of the titular ethnicity. 
Patriotism is a feeling, and hence it requires a 
sort of fatherly attitude in response. Although it 
may contradict the spirit of our discussion, I am 
deeply convinced that this country needs not a 
mere President-vojd but a President-father. This 
is a very important circumstance, and we do not 
have a person who could sacrifi ce himself. All 
our presidents and prime ministers are people 
who desire to live well. Nobody wants to pull a 
stake from himself, to wear rubber boots, and 
so on. Before becoming successful states, all of 
the European countries and North America had 
dictatorial systems of politics, because it was 
rational dictatorship that pushed forward the 
economy. Only provided that there is a certain 
level of development could you start talking 
about democracy, decentralization, etc. Take 
as an example the history of any developed 
country, the USA for instance. Nobody can 
convince me that democracy started there in 
the 17th century; you cannot throw out slavery, 
the last American slave died in 1964. 
As for us, we play democracy, because all we 
have is a so-called procedural democracy. 
Civil society is an artifi cially created entity. It 
did not emerge from the needs of the public. 
This idea was brought in from outside. The 
main task of civil society, if it is well founded, 
is in socializing a person. Civil society did not 
accomplish this task, and even worse, it led to 
public commercialism of individual needs and 
social relations. As a result, we ended up with 
escalating processes of the dehumanization of 
social relations and the degradation of social 
consciousness. We have to honestly admit 
this. This is what we have to start with. 
They say the state does not create favorable 
conditions. Yes, I agree. But you see, the 
problem is that young people who study abroad 
simply do not want to come back. This is a big 
problem. In case they return, they will not go 
to work in the Ministry of Education, even for 
$200. Instead, they will go to an international 
or private organization for $500. The quality 
of government, absence of a system of public 
administration, absence of demand for normal, 
strong people, leads to a situation whereby 
Harvard graduates are simply not wanted here. 
It is enough to graduate from a local university 
and help one’s parents – that is it. 
I would repeat once more that the situation in 
Kyrgyzstan is such that political conjuncture is 
heavily personifi ed from the very beginning. 
This is the way Kyrgyzstan chose, because 
Akaev came to power. Whether by chance 
or not, he came. If Masaliev had come to 
power, the situation in the country would be 
quite different. This is absolutely obvious. 
Personifi cation in defi ning the way forward 
is still the most important political resource 
in this country. Development of the country 
depends on the President’s conduct. We do 
not learn anything; in order to learn, we have 
to acknowledge something. We do not want 
to acknowledge other’s achievements. When 
we admire Japan, we admire only Toyota, but 
never the Japanese brain or the organization 
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of Japanese society. This is what we are not 
willing to learn. Mythologized ways of thinking 
leads to formation of illusions concerning the 
future; this is a sociological axiom, a well-known 
phenomenon.
Elvira Sarieva (Internews): I think you have 
drawn too gloomy a picture. As a matter of 
fact, both those who live abroad and those 
who work here in international organizations 
are concerned about their country. There is 
a vicious circle: professionals say, “we would 
work in civil service, but the salary is low,” 
whereas the government says, “we would pay 
more but there is no money.” There is an idea 
that this mechanism should be destroyed from 
inside. 
Muratbek Imanaliev: I do not understand what 
you mean ‘to destroy from the inside.’ Would 
you explain it, please? 
Elvira Sarieva (Internews): I mean that young 
personnel join the civil service, regardless of 
the salary or positions. Thus, by creating a 
critical mass, they change the system itself, 
because there is no point in waiting until the 
President changes his mind and re-evaluates 
his own activities. 
Muratbek Imanaliev: The problem lies 
somewhere deeper. There is no tradition of 
self-government, no tradition of statehood; all 
of these must be created. The problem is not 
with young Kyrgyz and old Party personnel. 
China is not the only example of a Communist 
government (though they are a little different 
now). Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos are 
communist countries, too. Of course, the 
system of government has changed slightly; 
nevertheless, communists are in power there.
The thing is that we have to fi nd our own way 
of governing the country. If we are successful 
in this, then this system will function regardless 
of the person in power. 
Daniar Imanaliev (“Alga, Kyrgyzstan!” 
party): Going back to the issue of personnel 
policy, I would like to ask a question of Mr. 
Kasymov. Today in Kyrgyzstan, people are 
divided into Akaev’s people and revolutionaries. 
I became a victim of this policy, since I was fi red 
for allegedly not taking part in a coup d’etat and 
allegedly being one of Akaev’s people. This 
happens everywhere: disagreeable people are 
being labeled as Akaev’s people and being 
fi red. Is this a problem of current personnel 
policy – rotation of personnel when Bakiev 
appoints a person but the staff does not accept 
the appointee? What is the fault of those people 
who were working for the sake of Kyrgyzstan, 
and suddenly, with the change of President, 
became enemies? For instance, I was not even 
acquainted with Akaev, and it is astonishing 
that I was fi red under this pretext. 
Narynbek Kasymov: There are many such 
cases. Akaev also fi red all communists when 
he came to power. As for me, I was working 
in the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party. Under Akaev, I was a head of the 
organizational department in the administration 
of the President. Now I am working at the 
Agency. Of course, they appoint their people 
to lucrative jobs… You have to approach this 
problem philosophically; this is life. 
Daniar Imanaliev (“Alga, Kyrgyzstan!” 
party): What is the role of your Agency then? 
Narynbek Kasymov: According to legislation, 
we are adopting international experience; 
everything is ideal on paper, but when it comes 
to reality kyrgyzchylyk is taking over. Nothing 
was done in fi fteen years, whereas now we 
are trying to improve something in a year and 
a half… Everyone is to be responsible, law-
abiding, and then there will be order. 
Ainura Cholponkulova (UNDP): A question 
to Mr. Satybaldiev: how can we create a 
mechanism of continuity in the parliament? 
With new MPs coming, 60 % of the supporting 
staff was changed. Consultants and experts 
were fi red; MPs brought their own people. 
There is no continuity at all, and in this sense, 
the parliament is much more vulnerable. And 
a second question: have you changed your 
consultants? 
Jantoro Satybaldiev: The second question 
is easier for me to answer. I did not change 
them; I hired those who already worked there. 
My assistant is Apsamat, Masaliev’s former 
assistant. As for supporting staff, it will be 
-24-
Who in Kyrgyzstan supports liberal demacracy?
K
Y
R
G
Y
ZS
TA
N
 B
R
IE
F 
  I
ss
ue
 №
 3
changed anyway. We have to change the 
system of forming parliament; that is when 
professional personnel will be hired. 
Chinara Omurkulova (Resident Director 
of IREX): In fact, if people are going abroad, 
this does not mean that they are not patriots. 
Before, I thought that a patriot was a person 
who sits here, boils in this mess, and eats from 
the same pot. However, according to my friends’ 
experience, those who go abroad and help from 
there are no less patriotic than those who stay 
and “boil” here. What can we talk about when 
a state offi cial at the level of a Secretary of 
State says that we should nominate personnel 
according to their family or clan belonging rather 
than their professionalism and competency?! I 
think that we, representatives of civil society, 
should openly express our disagreement with 
this sort of things. Especially since now, it is 
very diffi cult to defi ne who is from where. It may 
be that my parents were born in one place, 
but lived and worked their entire life in Osh 
Oblast. 
Muratbek Imanaliev: This is neither a social 
nor an economic problem – this is a political 
problem. This is a serious blow to the country’s 
sovereignty. Reduction in population is a terrible 
thing. At the moment, some 80,000 former 
and current citizens of Kyrgyzstan are living in 
Kazakhstan. Some 350,000 of our citizens are 
permanently living in Russia, including those in 
the second generation. Very few of them will 
return here. The same happened to Turks in 
Germany. All of the three million Turks who 
moved to Germany stayed there; their second 
and third generations are naturalized Germans, 
which is an alien element for Turkey. However, 
three million may not be that big loss for Turkey, 
which has a population of 75 million, whereas 
two millions is too much for Kyrgyzstan. This 
problem concerns me very much. 
WHO IN KYRGYZSTAN SUPPORTS LIBERAL DEMOCRACY?
Melissa Burn *
Recent IPP articles show that discussion over 
the best form of government for the Kyrgyz 
Republic has intensifi ed, especially in the 
current atmosphere of questioning the relative 
powers and responsibilities of the President, 
Prime Minister and Parliament. As the debate 
continues in the capitol, mostly among political 
elites or well-educated observers, it has 
been diffi cult to know for certain what “the 
public” thinks. Most Kyrgyz citizens are more 
focused on surviving from day to day than they 
are on abstract arguments over the form of 
government. This is understandable, given the 
real and pragmatic challenges facing families 
in the republic. 
There is also some question as to whether 
people share a common understanding of 
concepts such as, “democracy”, “civil liberty”, 
“presidentialism”, “parliamentary form of 
government” and other terms. And, some 
ask, if the economy remains weak, what use 
is this “democracy” that everyone says is 
so wonderful? The glowing promises made 
by political leaders and outside experts for 
more than a dozen years have not resulted in 
substantial improvement in the lives of ordinary 
citizens. Some people even feel that their lives 
are worse now than before. So, to the public, 
it might not matter very much what happens 
in Bishkek or what politicians say. People 
believe that, apart from tribalism and other 
forms of personal favoritism, the government 
and many elected representatives ignore their 
constituents after the election is won. 
Does this trend mean that people in Kyrgyzstan 
do not care about democracy, or that they are 
not suited to it or “ready” for it? The issue has 
been raised many times since the Central 
Asian republics gained independence. Political 
leaders, media analysts, social scientists 
and others disagree on the answers to this 
painful and divisive question. Underlying the 
question, of course, is the fear that the whole 
democratic enterprise is doomed to grinding 
*    Melissa Burn is a PhD Candidate from the Institute for Confl ict Analysis & Resolution, George Mason University, Virginia. The 2005 
survey data discussed here was collected for her doctoral dissertation.
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delay or eventual failure because of factors 
built into the society. Social factors generally 
fall into two broad categories: culturally-based 
expectations for group and leader behavior, 
tribalism, on the one hand and the priority given 
to stability and order, discouraging change 
and open political competition, on the other. 
Regardless of whether or not one believes that 
democracy, nominal or liberal, is the best form 
of government for Kyrgyzstan, it is useful in the 
current context to examine the level of support 
that it enjoys in the republic.
Social Factors
Accusations of tribalism at the elite level are 
a potent weapon and any discussion of such 
ingroup favoritism becomes so politically “hot” 
that the complaints are immediately taken up 
by the community rumor mill. As a result, it is 
diffi cult to know whether the public accepts such 
behavior as an expression of clan obligation (as 
some people suggest) or whether most people 
regard tribalism as illegitimate. Political leaders 
in other republics and some commentators 
in Kyrgyzstan insist that with such cultural 
foundations, transition to a true multi-party 
democracy based on platforms rather than 
personalities will require generations of re-
socialization. The cultural basis for tribalism – 
showing preference for members of one’s tribe, 
clan, or extended family – is clear in nomadic 
Kyrgyz culture, behavior which was in some 
ways strengthened by the Soviet economy of 
scarcity that encouraged reliance on informal 
networks for day-to-day living. But, it is not at 
all clear that clan favoritism is the only rule 
by which people make political decisions in 
modern Kyrgyzstan. Many people have other 
bases on which they decide who to trust and 
who to rely on for help, though extended kin 
group relations remain the cornerstone of 
social life for the majority of citizens in the 
republic, especially the ethnic Kyrgyz. And of 
course, Russians and other non-Central Asian 
citizens who are outside the clan system have 
their own ways of deciding who to trust, who 
will help them, and who deserves their political 
loyalty (if anyone does). When the state fails 
to fulfi ll people’s needs and expectations, they 
naturally turn to informal networks that meet 
those needs. Who can blame them? But, is it 
really true that people only vote for someone 
from their own clan, their own district, or 
whoever pays the most for their vote? These 
are important questions and more information 
is needed before they can be answered.
The issue of order and stability is similarly potent. 
Collectivist cultures, as both traditional Kyrgyz 
nomadic society and the subsequent Soviet 
system were, tend to value order and stability 
over innovation and risk. And, since the rights 
of the community are elevated above individual 
rights, there is often considerable pressure to 
conform to group opinions. Still, most people 
are generally capable of considering their 
options, looking at the examples around them, 
and learning to take steps toward what they 
see as a better way of doing things. However, 
because order and stability are prioritized 
and they are a standard part of the public 
discourse, accusations that a political actor 
or movement will cause disorder and chaos 
undermine support nearly as much as claiming 
“tribalism”. If a society values order and stability 
above personal liberty and authentic political 
competition, then the prospects for democracy 
are constrained because, as everyone knows, 
democracy can be very chaotic, especially in 
the early stages. Is this the case in Kyrgyzstan? 
Again, more information is needed about what 
the public thinks.
As the events of March 24th showed, popular 
legitimacy is crucial for any regime. Different 
people, however, have different ideas on the 
best way to build and sustain widespread 
legitimacy. Everyone agrees that corruption 
and tribalism must end and the government 
must be reformed, but there is little agreement 
on what this should look like. Knowing more 
about what people want can help clarify the 
agenda.  One important question, for example, 
is whether people will trust a political party 
more (or less) than they trust someone from 
their clan or district? How malleable are people 
in this regard? By legislating party politics, can 
true national parties develop or will people 
just transfer their loyalty to parties dominated 
by their clan or other identity group? How can 
parties attract constituencies that integrate 
different ethnic, social, and economic groups? 
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This is another way of asking what kind of 
boundaries there are between groups, how deep 
are the divisions, and whether the boundaries 
are fl exible enough to let new people into the 
community. Research and practical experience 
show that where group identities are threatened, 
especially during times of intense competition 
for scarce resources, group boundaries tend 
to harden rather than becoming more open, 
and tension between groups escalates. This 
means that transitions are especially diffi cult 
times to build bridges of trust and common 
interest between groups that see themselves 
as distinct from and in competition with one 
another. That is not to say that it can not be 
done, only that it requires careful thought and 
strong commitment. 
One interesting result of research into social 
groups is that, the more united a society is, the 
more important regime legitimacy becomes. 
Divided societies are less able to confer 
legitimacy (because they disagree about what 
it means) and, also, more easily manipulated 
by elites serving their own selfi sh interests. So, 
a strong republic with a legitimate government 
requires cohesion among the various groups in 
society, at least in terms of a political community. 
When different social groups recognize one 
another as belonging to the same civic or 
“moral” community, they are more willing to 
extend rights and protections to each other. 
When people know they are respected and not 
marginalized, they cooperate with one another, 
creating the dense network of civil ties that 
strengthen society. This is why the process of 
building national political parties goes together 
with creating linkages between different social 
groups. If parties develop only along ethnic, 
clan, rural-urban, or north-south lines, the 
divided society that results can not provide the 
legitimacy needed for effective governance in 
Kyrgyzstan.
What Do People Want?
In the late spring of 2005, a small social survey 
of 500 respondents throughout Kyrgyzstan 
asked people’s opinions on many of the 
issues relevant to the current discussion. The 
questionnaire was given to a random sample 
of people of all ethnicities in urban and rural 
settings of fi ve oblasts plus Bishkek. Some 
of the questions came from earlier surveys 
and the results can be compared to see how 
attitudes have changed over time. A survey is 
only one tool for understanding people’s views, 
of course, and can never give the fi nal answer 
on important questions. However, surveys do 
assess the diversity of views among various 
segments of society and show which people 
hold these views. For example, do people 
support democracy and, if so, which people are 
more likely to support it than others? In fact, 
when asked whether they agree or disagree 
with the idea that, “democracy may have 
problems but it is better than any other form of 
government”, 76% of Kyrgyzstani respondents 
Divided societies are less able to 
confer legitimacy and more easily 
manipulated by elites serving their own 
selfi sh interests.
Survey Statement Agree Disagree
Our country works better without a lot of opposition 
politicians criticizing the government.
28% 61%
The press and media in this country should not criticize the 
government and president openly.
32% 64%
Giving people more say in government decisions is more 
important than maintaining order.
64% 27%
People should be free to say what they want, even if it 
increases tensions in society.
76% 20%
Citizens should have the right to publish newspapers that 
express any and all political views.
84% 12%
-27-
Who in Kyrgyzstan supports liberal demacracy?
K
Y
R
G
Y
ZS
TA
N
 B
R
IE
F 
  I
ss
ue
 №
 3
agreed and only 13% disagreed (the rest were 
not sure). Of course, 47% also agreed with the 
statement that “democracies are not good at 
maintaining order,” which suggests that, while 
many Kyrgyz citizens prefer it as a political 
ideal, they recognize that it can be chaotic. 
Given that people have different ideas about 
what democracy means, it is helpful to know 
what they think about specifi c aspects of 
political competition and civil liberties. The 
following table lists several questions and 
the responses people gave to them. (In each 
case, the percentage of people who were not 
sure how to answer is not shown but may be 
discerned from the data.)
These results show that there is substantial 
support among Kyrgyz citizens for these aspects 
of liberal democracy, though some elements 
are more strongly supported than others. For 
example, support for press freedom is not as 
strong as support for individual free speech 
rights. Perhaps people have more confi dence 
in themselves and their neighbors than they 
do in the mass media. When asked which 
was more important, order and stability or free 
speech and public participation in government, 
democratic “voice” won by a large margin. 
Two questions solicited opinions on the power 
of the president relative to other branches of 
government. In response to the statement, “A 
government led by a strong, respected leader 
is better for the country than a government 
where power is shared with the parliament and 
the judiciary,” 59% disagreed and 31% agreed, 
suggesting support for a strong parliament and 
independent judiciary. However, a majority 
(57%) also agreed with the statement, “It is 
good to have a strong leader who is not limited 
by parliament and elections,” which shows 
ambivalence about how power should be 
distributed in government. 
When the data from 2005 are compared with 
earlier surveys, it becomes clear that support 
for liberal democracy is higher now than ever 
before, with some reservations. In a survey in 
2001, 54% of Kyrgyzstani respondents said 
that free speech was more important than strict 
order. In 2005 that number had grown to 76%. 
In 2001, 50% of 
people said that the 
president should 
not be permitted to 
dissolve parliament 
and rule by decree; 
in 2005 that number 
had grown to 75%. Regarding the president’s 
right to limit travel abroad, respondents who 
reject this option increased from 54% to 80%. 
When asked if the president should be permitted 
to cancel elections, in 2001 57% said this was 
not permissible but in 2005 82% rejected it. In 
the earlier survey 46% said that it was good to 
have a strong leader who did not have to share 
power with parliament and the judiciary, but this 
was reduced to 31% by 2005. 
The insecurity caused by harsh accusations in 
the media and the chaos of mass disturbances 
has had a measurable impact on citizen 
attitudes, however. Support for censoring the 
mass media to establish order increased from 
25% in 2001 to about 36% in 2005. In 2001 only 
25% of respondents felt that it was acceptable 
for the president to forbid meetings and mass 
demonstrations. This number had grown to 
38% after the March uprising. Perhaps these 
increased percentages are a temporary reaction 
to the March 2005 events but only time will tell. 
The message from the survey data seems to 
be that people support free speech and political 
competition but their threshold for verbal warfare 
in the media and chaos in the streets is limited. 
Too much disorder erodes support for liberal 
democracy, as one might expect anywhere in 
the world. But, even after the events of early 
2005, the percentage of people who said that 
democracies are not good at maintaining order 
decreased from 61% in 2003 to 47% in 2005.
Particularly at the national level, it is important 
for candidates to be able to garner support from 
districts other than their own. And, too, if political 
parties are to become truly national, they must 
reach out to constituencies from a broad cross-
section of society. Most people (65%) disagreed 
with a statement that they would always vote 
for the candidate from the voter’s own district. 
When asked if they would consider voting for a 
well-qualifi ed candidate from a different district, 
an overwhelming 95 percent said they would. 
Support for liberal 
democracy is higher 
now than ever 
before, with some 
reservations…
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This suggests that there is a solid basis for 
developing national parties and candidacies, 
if candidates are well-qualifi ed and reach out 
to a diverse interest base. However, among 
those with a strong sense of identity based 
on their kin group or on their home district 
(which was indicated by a variety of themes 
including that they would always vote for their 
relative and only for someone from their own 
district), support for political competition and 
free speech were much weaker than among 
the population as a whole. It seems that when 
people show a strong preference for their own 
“ingroup”, whether based on clan or district, 
they are also less interested in some aspects 
of liberal democracy.
When asked about tribalism in government, 
the results were also encouraging. In response 
to the statement, “It is wrong for a high 
government offi cial to give special treatment to 
people from his home district by giving them 
jobs in his ministry,” 81% agreed that it is wrong 
and only 16% disagreed. However, people 
acknowledged in interviews that if they were in 
a position of power, their relatives would come 
to them for favors and it would be diffi cult to 
refuse because of the high value placed on 
helping relatives. Therefore, a second item 
was included in the survey which stated, “If I 
were an offi cial, I would defi nitely (obligatorily) 
help my relative if he needed a job or needed 
help with a business.” To this, 30% agreed and 
65% disagreed. Of course, not everyone will 
answer such a question honestly. However, the 
data show that most people either reject clan 
favoritism or they recognize that it is strongly 
stigmatized, which is also important.
Another element of tribalism is the practice of 
kin groups agreeing to vote together as a block. 
When asked to respond to the statement, “If 
my father told me that he and my uncles were 
all voting for a particular candidate, this would 
strongly infl uence my choice of who to vote 
for,” most respondents (64%) disagreed though 
a substantial minority (33%) agreed. This sort 
of collaboration by constituents, in and of 
itself, is not necessarily a problem.  In mature 
democracies, for example, labor unions often 
encourage their members to support a particular 
candidate. If the goal is liberal democracy, each 
member of the collective must feel free to vote 
their conscience and, if they agree to vote with 
their relatives, they do so because they believe 
it is in their best interests, not simply because of 
social pressure to conform. In another measure 
of voting along clan lines, respondents were 
asked whether they agreed that, “I will always 
vote for my relative if he or she is running for 
political offi ce”. Fifty-nine percent disagreed with 
this statement and 36% agreed with it, arguing 
against fears that people use clan solidarity as 
their primary rule for voting (though it strongly 
infl uences their choice). 
In contrast to the general willingness to vote 
for well-qualifi ed leaders outside their own clan 
or district, people were more ambivalent when 
asked about attitudes toward other ethnic groups 
– whether someone would vote outside their 
ethnicity and whether minorities should have 
representatives in high government positions 
and in parliament. About one-quarter of the 
population expressed very open and inclusive 
views, the majority (66 percent) was in the 
middle, and ten percent expressed very biased 
ethnocentric views (strongly favoring their own 
ethnic group and showing prejudice against 
other ethnic groups). Of particular importance 
for building an inclusive political community, 
those who scored higher for ethnocentric views 
were also much more likely to see democracy 
as disorderly, more likely to say that the political 
opposition and media should not openly criticize 
the president and government, twice as likely to 
say that citizens should not be able to publish 
any and all political views, and more likely to 
disagree with the idea of citizens having more 
say in government. 
It is not clear from the data in the survey why 
there is a link between ethnocentrism and 
resistance to liberal democracy – surveys are 
good at describing and poor at explaining – but 
the pattern is clear. Those who say they would 
Those who say they would show 
favoritism in politics and public policy 
to their own clan, district, or ethnicity, 
are less supportive of liberal democracy 
than the majority of Kyrgyzstanis.
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show favoritism in politics and public policy to 
their own clan, district, or ethnicity, are less 
supportive of liberal democracy than the majority 
of Kyrgyzstanis. This does not mean that people 
who have a strong attachment to their family and 
home are anti-democratic. Rather, it indicates 
that people who base their political decisions 
on these things are less supportive of liberal 
democracy.
Conclusions
What do the results of the survey tell us about 
support for democracy in general, and liberal 
democracy in particular? Most Kyrgyzstanis 
support democratic competition and free speech, 
though harsh public attacks between political 
forces and chaos in the streets reduces this 
support. One result of this is that there is more 
support for the free speech rights of citizens 
than of the mass media. Stability and order 
are important, and having a strong president 
seems to be associated with these desires, but 
most people also want a strong parliament and 
judiciary. There is reason to believe that national 
political parties can grow and build broad 
constituencies, provided their candidates are 
well qualifi ed and they make a point of reaching 
out to diverse groups rather than setting groups 
in competition with one another.
One troubling result of the survey is that there 
are still strong divisions within Kyrgyz society, 
and people who show the most favoritism to 
their own ingroup, whether it is based on clan 
membership, district, or ethnicity, are the least 
likely to support liberal democracy. While the 
survey data can not explain this, research into 
social identity can. When a group is strongly 
prejudiced against others, members of the group 
assume that outsiders are just as prejudiced as 
they themselves are. So, members of a group 
who show strong favoritism to each other believe 
that outsiders will discriminate against them. If 
someone believes that other groups in society 
can not be trusted to treat them fairly, they will 
not want to see those people in positions of 
power. As a result, someone who shows strong 
ingroup favoritism does not trust the democratic 
concept of “government by the people” because 
he or she is afraid of what other groups might 
do. Given that any government needs popular 
legitimacy and that a strong society with many 
interconnections between groups enhances 
legitimacy, such social divisions can undermine 
any government, democratic or otherwise. One 
key lesson from this insight is that a political leader 
who tries to build support by infl aming ethnic, 
clan, or regional competition, aggravating the 
fears of social groups, undermines governance 
in general and democracy in particular. To further 
democracy, leaders must do two things: fi nd 
ways to facilitate trust and cooperation between 
social groups and encourage open but orderly 
free speech and political competition.
SELF-IDENTIFICATION OF MODERN KYRGYZ SOCIETY
Currently, the people of Kyrgyzstan are experiencing a “time of quest” for their identity.  The major 
questions that need to be answered today are “Who are we?”, “Where are we heading?”, “What 
do we have, can we have, and want to have?” Here, as is known, the so-called national identity 
level – self-identifi cation of the people, self-identifi cation of each member of society, and self-
identifi cation of each individual, plays not the least role.
Elmira Nogoybaeva *
*   Elmira Nogoybaeva is a chief expert of the International Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic.
The irony of fate is that the very “search for self” 
in the 1990s was one of the factors that lead to 
the collapse of the Great Empire - the USSR. 
That was a time of escalation of a number of 
unresolved problems within the enormous 
(and by nature synthetic) society called “ the 
soviet people.” Local, national and regional 
confl icts emerged every now and then, leading 
to changes in the political situation, and to the 
start of an irreversible processes in the end. 
The self-identity “gene” of the peoples of the 
Great Empire, which was in slumber for 70 
years and recently awoke from a lengthy sleep, 
destroyed the identity that was imposed by the 
mighty empire (which attempted to design a new 
community – the soviet people). The attempt to 
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unify entire strata of peoples’ historical, cultural 
and traditional values infamously failed. 
A new epoch and a new paradigm took over. 
For each former Soviet Union country and 
each ethnicity, the time for self-identifi cation 
came regardless of the structure, welfare or 
receipt of such compensations as freedom, 
political independence, or sovereignty. Thus, 
starting from 1995, ethnic identity growth 
intensifi ed in post soviet countries. Efforts were 
made to reevaluate their pasts – their places 
in the world history and culture; a new attitude 
towards the religion and their traditions formed. 
Their searches for self in the past intensifi ed in 
order to explain themselves in the present, and 
to justify the “legitimacy” of the present, so to 
speak. 
This process has been characterized by 
crucial reconsiderations of the recent past and 
by revival of that which had been forgotten 
undeservedly, particularly by the revival 
of national cultural traditions, history, and 
language. Here it becomes obvious that the 
state nationality policy of the USSR that had 
been pursued for 70 years infl icted serious 
damage on “national peripheries,” with serious 
consequences.  This policy was expressed in 
particularly through complete Russifi cation, 
through biased valuation of “white sports,” 
through interpretations of the histories of 
various “small” peoples and states of the Great 
Empire, at times simply belittling the dignity of 
these people through historical falsifi cations. 
Thus, almost two generations of the Kyrgyz, 
Kazakh, and other nationalities practically lost 
their national languages, which became merely 
colloquial dialects or “kitchen” languages, 
bluntly speaking,. Taking into account the fact 
that language always serves as one of the 
critical factors for the formation and sustained 
development of ethnicity, entire nations were 
being deprived of ethnic development. 
On the other side of the equation, this period 
was characterized by a feverish search for 
evidence that might prove that “we exist,” 
and not only exist, but also that we are rather 
signifi cant. A whole series of myths appeared 
to prove this point, starting from myths about 
the age of our nationality extending back to 
its origins – its cradle and roots.  Approaches 
to reveal the “historical truth” in Central Asian 
post-soviet republics began to acquire an 
increasingly hypertrophied character. 
Thus, based on the ancient sources that detail 
the past, the picture we see is that tribes 
later blended into common bowls of national 
formation – they started to defi ne fi gures. In 
2002, Kyrgyzstan offi cially marked the 2200th 
anniversary of the Kyrgyz nation. Meanwhile, 
through a well-known work of the Turkmen 
leader Saparmurat Niyazov, their history is 
traced back 5,000 years and starts with the 
forefather of the entire nation – Oguz Khan. 
New hypotheses and attitudes toward symbols 
and prominent national fi gures (such as Manas 
for the Kyrgyz nation, Amir Timur for Uzbeks, 
Sultan Sanjar for Turkmen, and so on) acquired 
different meanings; these initial meanings are 
complemented by an ideological component. A 
tendency emerged to search for confi rmation 
of the legitimacy of the existing regimes and 
their policies through the creation of ideological 
myth. To polish the historical facts, “formation 
images” of nations took shape – attributing to 
ethnic communities specifi c cultural, status and 
other characteristics. 
In this period, the identifi cation of divisions 
in the community that separate “ours” from 
“outsiders” became apparent and grew 
stronger. At the same time, formation of the 
position “us vs. them” is characteristic for all 
subjects attempting to identify themselves in 
the comparison of “I-another/others.” 
There exist several directions that are used 
or potentially can be used as a consolidating 
constant in self – for identifi cation of Kyrgyz 
society. 
Ethnic nationalism is one of the most widely 
spread self-identifi cation elements. Calls for 
“revival of the nation” were heard more often 
during the critical periods for the country, 
certainly including such reservations as “healthy 
nationalism,” “sound nationalism,” and “national 
spirit,” with reference to the experiences of 
other countries such as Japan, Turkey, and the 
USA. This practice is not peculiar to our country. 
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In Russia, the political rhetoric of Rogozin, 
Zhirinovskiy, Limonov, and other party offi cials, 
including communists, has appealed to national 
revival of the state. Even very democratic states 
could not avoid this tendency in certain periods 
of their development. The most illustrated 
example of an appeal for the position of “sound 
nationalism” is the discourse of D. Howell 1 
of the Tories of the Great Britain, who was a 
member of Margaret Thatcher’s Cabinet of for 
some time.
In the history of the Kyrgyz people there are 
practically no manifestations of nationalism, 
particularly in its reactionary form.  The ideology 
of the “Manas’ legacy” and the celebration of 
the 2200th anniversary of the Kyrgyz people, 
which obviously aimed at the minds of ethnic 
Kyrgyz, did not yield any fi rm values in the 
society. In a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic 
Kyrgyzstan, where the Kyrgyz live surrounded 
by many other ethnicities, a concept to unite 
the entire Kyrgyz nation – all Kyrgyzstanis, 
regardless of their ethnic background – based 
on so called civil nationalism seems more viable 
and acceptable. The traditional way of life of 
a multi-ethnic society, based on the principle 
of interpenetration and mutual enrichment of 
cultures, has long been a fundamental factor for 
the stability of society in Kyrgyzstan.  Probably 
this is why one of the most effi cient strategies 
of former president Askar Akaev was his policy 
which stated that “Kyrgyzstan is our common 
home.”
Religion is another potential direction for 
national identifi cation. Kyrgyz society is 
considered to be Muslim, and certain political 
forces are trying to appeal to Islam as a 
decisive trait of the Kyrgyz people’s identity. 
However, throughout many centuries, the 
territory of what would become Kyrgyzstan was 
distinguished by the integrated coexistence of 
many peoples, confessing various religions 
– Tengerianism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, 
Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and others. Since 
its independence, representatives of the various 
confessions that surged into the country have 
hurriedly begun to fi ll the gap formed during 
the soviet period.   Currently the religious 
situation in the country is characterized by 
revival tendencies; this point applies to Islam 
in particular.
An appeal for consistent territorial value - “Ala-
Too land” or “Tian-Shan mountains” can also 
be mentioned. Can we state with complete 
accountability that certain territories were 
“Kyrgyz lands from the earliest days?” It is 
not a fact that current “Kyrgyz territories,” land 
and boundaries, always belonged solely to the 
Kyrgyz as such.
Communal ownership of land, especially with 
nomadic cattle breeding across the major 
part of current Kyrgyzstan, provides grounds 
for talking about the connection of the Kyrgyz 
people to only part of the territory, pastures 
and separate plots. Moreover, the soviet 
period, with its unique policies of national 
ownership, practically erased the hereditary, 
tribal, and clan connection to land as private 
property. If restoration of historically formed 
private ownership, based on pre-revolutionary 
legislation, is currently in progress in the Baltic 
States and in some places within Russia, this 
practice seems practically unreal in the Central 
Asian states, especially in Kyrgyzstan,. 
In the life of Central Asia, in the self-
identifi cation of its peoples, the most essential, 
meaningful identity is the lowest, basic level of 
self-consciousness and public relations – the 
system of sub-ethnic family and tribal (or clan) 
relations. Within the framework of traditional 
Central Asian societies, prevalent even today, 
these relations play the decisive role in the 
processes of socialization, of identifi cation, and 
of solving the majority of issues, especially in 
rural areas. In Kyrgyzstan, more then two thirds 
of the Kyrgyz ethnicity live in rural areas, and 
the remaining “urban” part is closely related 
to villagers through close family relations and 
bonds. Such a system of relations and ties 
within the society is characteristic to other 
1    “Great Tories of the past, wrote Howell, were nationalist in a special sense, in which we should also be ones. Not nationalist of 
the troublesome sort that constantly watch the foreign devils to blame them for all sins, but those who are simply conscious that each 
nation differs from the rest, and therefore comfortably exists only with its own institutions and specifi c peculiarities and that these 
specifi c peculiarities per se are an integral part of the national existence, and the people feel lost and anxious if they are lost.” D. The 
Conservative Tradition and the 1980s. Three Gifts of Insight Restored. L., 1980, P.6.
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nations living in the Fergana Valley, particularly 
to Uzbeks and Tajiks, who have a peculiar 
legend of their origin that is similar in content to 
the Kyrgyz Sanjira . 
The system of family and tribe/clan relations 
became the core of social structure. 
Governments could be ruined, perish and 
reappear; dynasties easily replaced each 
other at the reigns of government in the 
administration system; but the micro-structure 
of the society, i.e. fi rm corporations, remained 
almost without changes. Moreover, newly 
established government entities eagerly took 
the old structure under their protection, and 
carefully protected it from changes. Therefore, 
political and even social crises usually did not 
lead to internal structural renovation. 
As a rule, clan corporate relations are interpreted 
as a negative phenomenon in contemporary 
scientifi c and political literature. It is called 
“tribalism,” and viewed through a prism of so 
called “archaic” traditional society 2.
In conclusion, I would like to mention a rather 
well known fact. Identifi cation of each individual 
with a strong community (holding constant 
issues of economics, human rights, freedom 
of expression and etc.) signifi cantly improves 
the self-esteem of that person. In other words, 
the more stable and developed a society is, 
the more stable is the social identifi cation 
and psychological comfort of its community 
members, and, no matter how paradoxical 
it might seem, the less the ethnic identity is 
expressed. 
Thus, in gaining “outside” stability, gradually 
identifi cation on the ethnic and territorial level 
are reduced, and professional and personal 
identifi cation comes into the foreground; as a 
result, the feelings of anxiety disappear, and 
gradually confi dence in the future appears. 
2    Different authors researched this problem in Kyrgyzstan during different times, including the doctor of legal sciences professor 
Nurbekov K.N., who attempted to show more objectively the retrospective genesis of the Kyrgyz society in his work “History of state 
and law in the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic.” In the conditions of the USSR, with the prevaling “Class” approach, it was practically 
impossible to conduct this type of serious scientifi c work. As for modern works on clan/corporate relations as one of the ways to 
national identity, such works remain mostly insuffi cient and one-sided.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RISKS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE 
POLITICAL STABILITY IN KYRGYZSTAN 
Economic and social wellbeing is the basis of political stability in any country. In Kyrgyzstan 
unfortunately, these components of political stability are increasingly shattered nowadays by 
periodic, negative developments and occurrences. A decline in the authority of power, of the 
government, is apparent, which indicates and portends serious social problems.
Gulasel Abylova *
*    Gulasel Abylova, a chief expert of the International Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, is 
a participant of the project “Policy debate and good governance”. This is the third essay in a series of articles by participants of the 
project
The inability of the government to handle 
developments and sustain a relative balance of 
interests became evident in several contexts: 
(1) the forced capture and retention of the 
Karakeche coal mine by Motuev, (2) incessant 
rallies either in approval or disapproval of the 
appointment of offi cials, and (3) a short-term, 
yet a very symptomatic confl ict in Iskra village. 
Social tension amongst the people is also 
aggravated by various indicators of economic 
decline. Living standards remain low for the 
majority of the population: more then 45% of 
the population lives in poverty, and people living 
in conditions of extreme poverty constitute 
13.4%. A growing gap between rural and urban 
areas is observed: approximately 80% of the 
country’s poor population lives in rural areas. 
Outfl ow of qualifi ed specialists from the country 
is still under way: currently more then 500,000 
citizens of Kyrgyzstan, mainly young people, 
are working in Russia, Kazakhstan, countries 
of Western Europe and North America, and 
elsewhere.  Moreover, their rate of return 
remains very low. 
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Escalation of social problems and the 
weakening of the government’s role can be 
explained according to the following reasons: 
•   Lack of a nation system of values. The 
population of Kyrgyzstan has not yet formed 
into a unifi ed group, consolidated on the 
basis of co-citizenship. Ethnic, tribal and 
territorial forms of self-identifi cation prevail, 
which predetermines the government’s 
weak infl uence as a platform for uniting 
the whole population. One the results of 
the events of March 24th, 2005 was the 
outright ignoring of laws and decrees by 
the offi cial authorities, which is evident 
from the seizure of the Karakeche coal 
mine, confusion around the appointment of 
governors 3 and rayon akims 4 , and other 
staffi ng issues.
•  Rampant spread of corruption. Akaev’s 
corrupted regime was one of the major 
causes of the events of March 24th. 
Though the idea of fi ghting against 
corruption was one of the major points in 
the offi cials’ rhetoric, no cardinal changes 
have been observed in either legislation 
or practice. This problem holds economic 
consequences: lack of effective laws and 
regulation for obtaining permission to carry 
out business activities; lack of legal and 
effi cient channels for dialogue between the 
government and private business, leading 
to the failure of the country to achieve 
the level of economic growth suffi cient to 
ensure the servicing and repayment of the 
national debt.
  Resources meant for improvement of the 
administration system and development 
of democratic institutions were used 
ineffi ciently, thus decreasing the earlier 
estimated return of the foreign loans. When 
providing assistance, insuffi cient attention 
was given to the level of preparedness 
of the recipient state and its institutions 
to receive the assistance and to use it 
adequately.  Due to an opaque political 
system, ineffi cient use of foreign loans was 
permitted, the money of foreign tax-payers 
allocated for the country was not always 
used for its intended purpose (as people 
who did not even intend to develop the 
country got hold of some of it). The need 
to service debt signifi cantly decreased 
the amount of resources available for the 
government to allocate to the support of 
small and medium business development, 
to start up state enterprises standing idle, 
and to address social issues.
•  Decline of economic indicators/growth 
of income discrepancies amongst the 
population.  The economy of Kyrgyzstan 
is still functioning, yet not growing. The 
ensuing poverty, lack of workplaces, growth 
of social and economic discrepancies 
between the regions, and loss of general 
inclusiveness in the development of the 
economy create risks for the integrity of the 
national economy. There is no real support 
for entrepreneurship. Small enterprises, 
cooperatives, and other small unions of 
workers that do not require signifi cant 
expenses for technical equipment or 
power supply have signifi cant possibilities 
to create new work places. However, this 
sector lacks relevant normative and legal 
precedents, which also hampers economic 
growth. 
  As the rural economy fails to provide the 
population with food, the majority of food 
and agricultural products are imported from 
neighboring countries. Rural producers are 
left without state support. Particularly, the 
supply of fuel and lubrication materials is 
not regulated, thus leading to considerable 
interruptions in its supply to producers 
during the peak season. Provision of 
farming equipment and realization of 
markets are not defi ned. 
Social tension amongst the population 
was accumulated during the rule of the 
previous government as well: ineffi cient state 
administration, double standards of principles, 
and dissatisfaction of the population with the 
social and economic policies of the government 
actually lead to the events of March 24th. 
Ineffi cient state institutions, massive and costly 
3    Head of regional (oblast) state administration
4       Head of district (raion) state administration
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administrative territorial divisions, unstable 
legislation, rampant corruption, and a race for 
revenues among authorities became the major 
obstacles for the development of the national 
economy or solutions to social problems. 
A year has elapsed since the revolution, and 
it seems that the time has come to sum up 
the results. However, the future prospects of 
the state are not yet defi ned.  The authorities 
have not started to elaborate the county’s 
development strategy. Political intrigue is 
present in the actions of the offi cials, which 
further exacerbates the general instability in 
the country. 
In order to improve the existing situation in some 
way, it is necessary to fulfi ll certain conditions: 
First, for further development of the country, 
tougher, more responsible and decisive 
actions need to be taken by its management. 
This step could rehabilitate the people’s trust 
in the government.  Special attention should 
be devoted to limiting the participation of the 
political and economic elites in the “pie-sharing.” 
It is necessary to make a tradition of regularly 
reporting on and holding accountable offi cials 
for any actions or inaction. 
Second, there is an urgent need for public 
participation in budgeting; this will make the 
government accountable, and raise the public 
trust the government. The solution lies not only 
in strengthening the legal basis for fi ghting 
against corruption, but also in improving the 
political system, as well as increasing the 
transparency of state and local budgets. 
The strategy of the state policy on employment 
should be aimed at preventing the growth of 
unemployment, and at alleviating the impact of 
factors that cause unemployment and increase 
social tension. It is necessary to motivate young 
specialists living in rural areas (with higher 
wages, housing, land plots, etc) to stay there 
and not leave for cities or neighboring countries 
in search of jobs. Development of local self-
governance would support improvements in the 
effi ciency of local public services provision. 
With the existing sharp income gap amongst 
the population, it is crucial to preserve general 
access to services in the social sphere – in 
health care, education, and culture (they 
should at least be free of charge at the level 
of socially guaranteed standards, stipulated by 
legislation).  It is also necessary to guarantee 
everyone with basic standards of housing. 
Only in this case will it be possible to realize 
the necessary quality of work force, relatively 
equal start up opportunities for young people, 
and basic living standard and social protection 
of the population, as well as to alleviate social 
tension. 
The events in Iskra village showed that the 
decision-making procedures used by the 
government give more causes for further 
escalation and fomentation of confl ict then for 
its prevention. The government should take 
decisive, possibly even strong measures to 
eliminate similar incidents. 
In order to achieve long-term political stability 
and integration into the world economy, the 
government of the Kyrgyz Republic should take 
steps to reform its political system. In particular, 
it is necessary to conduct constitutional reforms 
and transform the current presidential system 
of governance, characterized by insuffi cient 
accountability and transparency, into a more 
open, accountable form of administration, 
based on public participation. 
Moreover, political changes should be used to 
ensure complete transparency of foreign aid 
distribution. It is necessary to establish periodic 
public reporting of organizations on how various 
foreign assistance resources are used, and with 
what results, as well as political responsibility 
of the government for ineffi cient use of foreign 
aid. This step would require readiness by the 
government to adopt strategic decisions. 
The social sphere directly infl uences the pace 
and quality of national economic growth. 
Furthermore, this infl uence will only increase. 
A high level of citizens’ material and spiritual 
wellbeing, a dominating status of the middle 
class in the structure of the society, and a 
realization of social partnership principles will 
determine the long-term economic prospects 
of the country, as well as its social and political 
stability. 
